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1. Introduction 
The cornerstone models of Finance build upon the assumption that a representative economic 
agent acts rationally (e.g. Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964; Samuelson, 1970). The rationality 
assumption, which requires individuals to correctly apply and carry out mathematical and 
statistical methods, has been challenged by Behavioral Finance scholars. In contrast to the 
representative agent model, studies have demonstrated the existence of a large degree of 
variability in individuals’ ability to solve complex problems. When presented with such 
problems, most individuals tend to rely on simple heuristics instead of performing the requisite 
calculations (e.g. see Thaler, 1993, 2005; Barberis and Thaler, 2003; Shefrin, 2007 for surveys). 
The heterogeneity in individuals’ cognitive capacities suggests that we may observe significant 
differences in their financial decisions. Broader access to the stock market coupled with the 
increasing complexity of the financial environment (e.g. large number of sophisticated financial 
instruments, interconnectedness of global markets, etc.) renders the understanding of the 
relationship between individuals’ cognitive capacities and financial decisions both conceptually 
important and practically relevant. 
The goal of our work is to provide an assessment of the skills that predict trader performance in 
a unified setting. Drivers of trader performance have previously been studied in isolation in 
different strands of the literature with various types of data (archival, experimental and 
neuroimaging). Our methodological choice is to use an experimental asset market which allows 
us to control various aspects of the trading environment (see Bossaerts, 2009; Frydman et al. 
2014; Noussair and Tucker, 2014). 
Specifically, we choose a market environment that enables us to manage the flow of 
information into the market so that the effect of individual skills is not confounded with that of 
insider trading. In our environment, each trader in the market is given a signal regarding the true 
value of the traded asset (see Plott and Sunder, 1988, henceforth PS).   
The experimental methodology also allows us to collect a large set of individual measures for 
traders. Controlling for an extensive number of individual characteristics (such as IQ, financial 
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literacy, personality traits, educational background and risk attitudes) ensures the robustness of 
the effect of our hypothesized predictors.  
To derive our main hypotheses, which we test experimentally, we develop a learning model in 
which the market is populated by traders who differ in terms of cognitive skills. Following the 
steps of previous works in Behavioral Finance (e.g. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998; 
Rabin, 2002; Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos, 2015) and extending classical market microstructure 
frameworks (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987), we consider markets in 
which some traders (fail to) use orders (asset prices, bids and asks) to update their beliefs about 
asset valuation. We refer to these traders as reflective (non-reflective). 
Reflective and non-reflective traders 
The literature in cognitive psychology has identified many behavioral biases in beliefs 
updating (e.g. Kahneman, 2011). A common thread running through each of these biases is the 
individual’s inability to refrain from using automatic responses and simple heuristics which 
ultimately lead to a failure to apply Bayes’ rule (Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011). Research in 
cognitive science has identified and validated the cognitive reflection test (henceforth CRT) as a 
method for capturing a person’s ability to avoid common behavioral biases (Oechssler, Roider 
and Schmitz, 2009; Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011, 2014). The CRT consists of questions 
which all have an appealing and intuitive, yet incorrect, answer (Frederick, 2005). Upon 
reflection, one may disregard the intuitive answer in favor of the correct one.  
Although CRT scores have been found to moderately and positively correlate with general 
measures of intelligence, only CRT has been found to correlate with an individual’s capacity to use 
Bayes’ rule adequately (e.g. Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz, 2009; Campitelli and Labollita, 2010; 
Lesage, Navarrete and De Neys, 2013; Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011, 2014; Sirota, Juanchich 
and Hagmayer, 2014). Thus, in our setting CRT appears to be the cognitive measure best suited to 
assess an individual’s capacity to update her belief regarding the valuation of the asset. In a 
market, this capacity is essential to infer other trader’s information from orders and thus make 
more informed and more profitable decisions. 
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Referring to cognitive reflection as a major dimension of trader performance is also consistent 
with the fact that CRT-type questions are commonly asked in Wall Street interviews for trading 
positions (Zhou, 2008; Crack, 2014). Not surprisingly, professional traders were found to score 
remarkably high on the CRT (Thoma et al. 2015).1  
Based on extensive simulations with our learning model, we hypothesize that reflective traders 
who are able to perform Bayesian updating based on orders should earn more than non-reflective 
traders. In addition, our learning model reveals that trader performance not only relies on a 
trader’s capacity to perform Bayesian updating but also on a trader’s understanding of the 
relative proportions of reflective and non-reflective traders in the market. We refer to those 
traders who are able to assess with precision the proportion of reflective and non-reflective 
traders in the market as perceptive. 
Perceptive and non-perceptive traders 
Perceptive traders better assess the precision of the information contained in orders than non-
perceptive traders, because they are more likely to know whether orders are placed by reflective or 
non-reflective traders. It follows that perceptive traders hold more accurate beliefs about the true 
value of the asset compared to non-perceptive traders. We thus expect perceptive traders to engage 
in more profitable trades than non-perceptive traders. An important implication of our learning 
model is that reflective and perceptive skills are complementary. This holds because traders can 
only benefit from knowing the precision of market signals if they possess the ability to process 
such signals. 
From an empirical standpoint, we follow previous research on the role of intuition in financial 
markets (Bruguier, Quartz and Bossaerts, 2010, henceforth BQB) by defining perceptive traders 
as those having the capacity to infer others’ intentions (often referred to as theory of mind, e.g. 
Frith and Frith, 1999). BQB show that trader intuition, measured with the theory of mind eye 
                                                          
1 In the Experimental Finance literature CRT scores have been found to predict subjects’ earnings in experimental 
asset markets with bubbles (Noussair, Tucker and Xu, 2014; Corgnet et al. 2015). 
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gaze test (henceforth ToM test, Baron-Cohen et al. 1997), correlates with an individual’s ability 
to predict price changes in experimental asset markets with insiders. They show that individuals 
with high theory of mind skills are more likely to predict whether prices are set by uninformed 
traders or insiders. In our markets, all traders start with a signal about the value of the asset so 
that there are no insiders. However, reflective traders are likely to become insiders (or at least 
more informed than non-reflective traders) over the course of the market as they learn other 
traders’ private information from orders. It thus follows from BQB that we should expect high 
theory of mind traders to more accurately assess whether orders are set by reflective or non-
reflective traders. 
In line with our learning model, we find, using experimental asset markets, that both cognitive 
reflection and theory of mind skills affect trader performance positively. By analyzing traders’ 
orders and shareholdings, we find that traders who are both reflective and perceptive achieve 
higher earnings than traders who are non-reflective and non-perceptive because they are more 
likely to infer the true value of the asset. We also find evidence for the complementarity of 
reflective (as measured with CRT) and perceptive (as measured with the ToM test) skills in line 
with our model. We show that perceptive skills increase earnings the most for reflective traders. 
Finally, we identify situations in which trader skills are especially relevant. For example, we 
show that reflective traders outperform non-reflective traders the most when the proportion of 
reflective traders in the market is low. This is most likely due to the fact that there are fewer 
reflective traders competing to seize the wealth of non-reflective traders in that case. 
2. Contribution to previous literature 
This study impacts several related, though not previously connected, strands of the literature, 
which have considered financial literacy, general intelligence, behavioral biases, theory of mind 
and self-monitoring as measures of a trader’s skills. 
Financial literacy 
The extensive research on financial education and financial literacy has attempted to identify 
specific concepts and skills that can enable better financial decisions, especially decisions related 
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to retirement savings. Financial literacy, which has been defined as the understanding of key 
financial concepts such as compound interest and the present value of money (Alba and 
Hutchinson, 1987) has been linked to sound financial decisions such as retirement savings (e.g. 
Adams and Rau, 2011) and household portfolio diversification (Von Gaudecker, 2015). 
However, a recent meta-analysis (Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer, 2014), shows that the effect 
of financial literacy is drastically reduced upon the introduction of additional controls, such as 
personality traits, in the analysis. Our results are consistent with these findings as we show that 
financial literacy does not significantly affect trader performance when we include relevant 
control variables in the analysis such as CRT, IQ or personality traits. 
General intelligence 
Grinblatt, Keloharju and Linnainmaa (2012) also showed, using the same database of Finnish 
men, that the trades of high-IQ males outperformed those of low-IQ males. These high-IQ 
individuals exhibited better market timing than their low-IQ counterparts and were more likely to 
buy stocks whose price was increasing (winning stocks) and sell stocks whose price was 
decreasing (losing stocks). These findings illustrate that high-IQ traders may have been able to 
mitigate behavioral biases such as the well-documented disposition effect (e.g. Odean, 1998; 
Chen et al. 2007). However, the authors leave to further research the study of the exact causes 
underlying the large returns of high-IQ traders (Grinblatt, Keloharju and Linnainmaa, 2012). Our 
study extends these works by assessing the effect of IQ in a controlled environment in which we 
can pinpoint the sources of high trader performance. We show that IQ, measured using Raven 
scores, is likely to have a positive and significant effect on trader performance because it 
significantly correlates with our two main drivers of trader performance: cognitive reflection and 
theory of mind.  
Behavioral finance, heuristics and biases 
The Behavioral Finance literature has grown by demonstrating how the heuristics and biases 
identified by cognitive psychologists (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) can distort financial 
decisions. Behavioral biases that have been shown to correlate with trading behavior include 
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overconfidence as well as an individual’s failure to understand random sampling. Our work 
contributes to this literature by demonstrating that cognitive reflection, which has been shown to 
be the best predictor of people’s ability to avoid behavioral biases (e.g Oechssler, Roider and 
Schmitz, 2009; Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011, 2014), significantly affects trader earnings. 
This finding adds to the Behavioral Finance literature by directly connecting trader performance 
to a specific cognitive skill.  
Theory of mind and trader intuition 
The work of BQB highlights the role of trader intuition as an important determinant of trader 
performance. BQB were able to identify a brain area (paracingulate cortex) that activates when 
insider trading is present in the market. The authors link this brain area to trader intuition and, 
more specifically, to an individual’s theory of mind skills. Their study showed that theory of mind 
skills as measured by, for example, the eye gaze test correlate with one’s ability to predict price 
changes in experimental asset markets with insiders. The authors did not, however, study the 
relationship between trading behavior and theory of mind skills as they chose to focus on 
forecasting abilities: 
“Of course, thinking about prices and forecasting them are integral to successful trading, but 
these two steps alone leave out the actual placing of orders. Trading intuition concerns not 
only assessment of what is going on in the market and prediction of future prices, but also 
submission of the right orders. Our study only considers the first two facets; future work 
should shed light on the third.”  
Bruguier, Quartz and Bossaerts (2010), p. 1721 
Our work seeks to address this third facet of successful trading by assessing the relationship 
between a trader’s performance and theory of mind skills. 
Self-monitoring and miscalibration 
Our analysis also builds upon the work of Biais et al. (2005) as we used a similar trading 
environment (see PS) to study the effect of individual characteristics on trader performance. The 
authors focus on self-monitoring (a measure of one’s disposition to attend social cues, Snyder 
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and Gangestad, 1986) as well as overconfidence which was measured using a miscalibration test 
(e.g. Russo and Schoemaker, 1992). They conjectured that individuals who attain high scores on 
the self-monitoring scale would behave more strategically than others, as they would more 
accurately infer other traders’ signals from asset prices. By contrast, overconfidence would 
inhibit traders’ learning of the true valuation of the asset. Ultimately, the authors posited that 
traders who perform well on both the self-monitoring scale and miscalibration scales should earn 
higher trading profits in market situations in which the inference regarding the true value of the 
asset is particularly challenging. They identify these market situations as winner’s curse traps in 
which traders may be induced to hold an incorrect belief of the true value of the asset. They 
confirmed these conjectures in an oral double auction trading experiment. Our work supports 
Bias et al. (2005) by showing that certain market situations such as winner’s curse traps are key 
to understanding trader performance. Our results also confirm that a crucial dimension of trader 
performance is one’s capacity to adequately infer information from orders. Using both a learning 
model and laboratory experiments, we extend Bias et al. (2005) by identifying two independent 
but complementary drivers (operationalized using CRT and ToM tests) of a trader’s capacity to 
update beliefs correctly.  
3. Design 
3.1. Asset markets 
Our experimental asset market environment is similar to the experimental design of Plott and 
Sunder (1988, henceforth PS). The only notable difference with their original design is that our 
study uses a computerized instead of an oral continuous double auction. We made this choice 
purposefully as computerized continuous double auction trading mechanisms are widely used in 
actual stock market exchanges (Parsons et al. 2008) and in online prediction markets 
(www.predictit.org).2 The PS design is suited to our study as it implements a rich environment 
including both public and private information. A trader’s ability to update her belief of the asset 
                                                          
2 In continuous double auctions, traders can submit, at any time, offers to buy or sell the asset. Traders can also 
accept other traders’ existing orders to buy or sell an asset. 
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value by using her private information in conjunction with the information inferred from other 
traders’ orders is the key element of our study of the determinants of individual trader 
performance. 
We use the same parameters as in the PS study (Market 9, Treatment C) regarding possible 
asset values, endowments and the number of market replications. Each experimental session 
consisted of 17 market periods during which participants could trade an experimental asset 
whose exact value was not known with certainty. This asset could assume one of three possible 
values: 50, 240 or 490 francs. A franc was worth $0.001. At the beginning of each market period, 
every trader was informed of a possible value the asset could not take. As half of the traders were 
given one hint (e.g. “Not 50”) and the other half were given the other possible hint (e.g. “Not 
240”), the aggregate information available to all traders in the market was complete. PS argue 
that in a rational expectation equilibrium prices should reflect the true value of the asset (e.g. 
490). In this paper, we focus on individual trading behavior rather than on the aggregation of 
information at the market level.3 More specifically, we focus on the relationship between trader 
performance and individual characteristics. We assess performance by studying traders’ earnings 
as well as their orders and shareholdings. 
3.2. Protocol 
We recruited a total of 204 participants from a subject pool of more than 1,500 students at a 
major Western US University. We conducted a total of 17 sessions, each with 12 traders. In the 
ten baseline sessions, traders were endowed with 1,200 francs in cash and 4 shares. To ensure 
our results are not artifacts of this specific endowment structure, two sessions were run using the 
PS approach of endowing each subject with a 25,000 franc loan that had to be repaid at the end 
of each period and 4 shares. We added a third treatment to assess the robustness of our findings 
                                                          
3 We leave the study of information aggregation at the market level to Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015a), which 
includes a detailed analysis of this topic. 
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to higher stakes by doubling both the traders’ initial cash endowment (to 2,400 francs) as well as 
the value of shares (to 100, 480 and 980).4 
Before each session started subjects completed a 10-minute training quiz regarding the 
probability of occurrence of each possible asset value (50, 240 or 490 francs) at the end of each 
of the 17 markets. This training (see online Appendix O1, Instructions Part 1) consisted of 
having subjects predict the outcome of a spinning wheel over 10 trials. Each correct prediction 
was rewarded 25 cents, and each incorrect answer incurred a 10 cent penalty. Average earnings 
(including a $7 show-up fee) for the two and one-half hour experiments were equal to $48.0 in 
our ten baseline sessions, $33.5 in our two loan sessions and $86.3 in our five high stakes 
sessions. We summarize our experimental design in Table 1.  
Table 1: Summary of our experimental design 
3.3. Surveys 
As part of the experiment, participants answered questionnaires regarding various 
psychological and cognitive traits on two separate occasions. At the conclusion of the last market 
period, subjects participated in a brief end-of-experiment survey. Then, one month after the 
original study they were invited to complete a more comprehensive survey.  
                                                          
4 In this treatment, we also made changes in the writing of the instructions (see online Appendix O1 for the 
instructions and Appendix F5 for a separate analysis of the high stakes treatment). 
 
Treatment Number 
of 
traders 
Number 
of markets 
(market length in 
minutes) 
-Sessions- 
Endowment / 
Loan 
Francs 
(Assets) 
Asset values 
Francs 
(Probabilities) 
Trading 
mechanism 
 
Baseline 12 
17 (5) 
- 10 - 
1,200 
(4) 
50, 240, 490 
(0.35,0.45,0.20) 
Computerized 
continuous 
double auction 
 
Loan 
 
Same 17 (5) 
- 2 - 
25,000 Loan 
(4) 
Same Same 
 
High 
Stakes 
Same 17 (5) 
- 5 - 
2,400 
(4) 
100, 480, 980 
(0.35,0.45,0.20) 
Same 
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One-hour follow-up lab survey 
All of the subjects who participated in our experiments were invited one month after the 
original study to complete a one-hour survey as part of the laboratory policy to collect individual 
information about subjects who are registered in the pool. A large majority of participants 
completed the one-hour survey (82%, 167 out of 204).5 Importantly, the subjects who attended 
the survey do not significantly differ from the subjects who did not in terms of trader earnings 
(p-value = 0.16, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, WRS henceforth).  
The survey was computerized, and, as is common practice in the literature, the tests were not 
incentivized though subjects earned a $15 flat fee. The survey captured our two main measures 
of trader performance, cognitive reflection and theory of mind, through the CRT and ToM test. 
Cognitive reflection test 
We administered the extended (seven-question) version of the CRT in which the original three 
questions (Frederick, 2005) are augmented with four additional questions recently developed and 
validated by Toplak, West and Stanovich (2014) (see Appendix A for details). Our measure of 
cognitive reflection is given by the total number of correct answers (from 0 to 7). The Cronbach 
alpha reliability score for the extended CRT (0.70) is in line with that of Toplak, West and 
Stanovich (2014) who reported a reliability of 0.72. Subjects had 5 minutes to complete the CRT. 
Theory of mind test 
Following BQB and De Martino et al. (2013), we administered the ToM test (Baron-Cohen et 
al. 1997) to assess subjects’ theory of mind skills. In this task, participants looked at images of 
people’s eyes and had to choose one of four feelings that best described the mental state of the 
person whose eyes were shown. Our ToM score is defined as the number of correct answers to 
the 36 question, 10-minute test. In Appendix A, we present the remaining variables included in 
the follow-up survey.  
                                                          
5 Out of the 167 subjects who completed the survey, 15 completed the survey more than two months after the 
completion of the market experiments.  
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End-of-experiment survey 
In addition, at the end of each session, subjects answered demographic questions and 
completed a series of cognitive tests. The duration of the survey was 25 minutes. These tasks 
were computerized and the tests were not incentivized though subjects earned a $3 flat fee for 
completing the survey. The survey included tests for financial literacy and self-monitoring. 
Participants also took the CRT and the Raven test exactly as in the follow-up survey.6  
In the five high stakes sessions, we also included a Bayesian updating test taken from Charness 
and Rabin (2009). In four of the five high stakes sessions, we also asked subjects to assess their 
session rank on the CRT (see Appendix D2 for the corresponding analysis). We describe in detail 
the tests used in the end-of-experiment survey in Appendix A. 
4. Model 
To derive our main hypotheses, we develop a learning model that closely mimics our 
experimental market. One important aspect of the model is the inclusion of a heterogeneous 
population of agents. The model relates to previous market microstructure research by partially 
relying on Bayesian learning to describe how traders infer information from orders. We extend 
previous microstructure research by studying markets in which some traders may not use Bayes’ 
rule or may not correctly assess the proportion of traders using Bayes’ rule. Our model extends 
both market microstructure and behavioral finance models by (1) considering the case in which 
traders have disperse information (see PS) and (2) allowing them to learn not only from asset 
prices but also from buy and sell orders. Our work closely relates to market microstructure models 
in which traders’ strategies directly follow from their beliefs about the value of the asset (e.g. 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987). Traders buy (sell) the asset whenever a 
sell offer (a buy offer) is below (above) their current belief of the true value of the asset. In the 
                                                          
6 One advantage of measuring CRT twice is that it allowed us to conduct our CRT analysis for the whole sample 
instead of considering the subsample of 82% of participants who came back for the follow-up survey (see e.g. Table 
3). Another advantage of measuring CRT and Raven twice is that it enables us to show that subjects who did not 
participate in the follow-up survey did not significantly differ from those who did participate with respect to these 
two cognitive tests (p-values > 0.20, WRS). Due to time constraints, we did not add the theory of mind test to the 
end-of-experiment survey. 
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case in which all traders learn the true value of the asset, our model reaches a situation in which 
prices equal the rational expectation equilibrium prediction. In that case, traders would only trade 
the asset at its true value similar to a fully-revealing rational expectation equilibrium in which 
traders’ beliefs coincide with the equilibrium price of the asset. In our model, asset prices do not 
instantaneously converge to the true value of the asset. Even in the most favorable case in which 
the market is populated solely by traders who are reflective (and all traders know that all other 
traders are reflective), it takes on average three orders for traders’ beliefs to converge to the true 
value of the asset and for prices to trade at this exact value.7 Given the complexity of the model in 
which traders infer the true value of the asset using all orders, we use simulations to derive our 
main hypotheses (see Section 4.4).8  
4.1. Trading and information 
We follow our experimental design in modeling the trading process. In particular, we assume 
prices occur as a result of a continuous flow of bids and asks posted by traders. Our model is based 
on a decentralized auction mechanism in which all traders (1) have the same portfolio of cash and 
shares and (2) receive a hint about the true value of the asset.9 
 At the beginning of each market, a trader (selected at random) posts a bid-ask spread. A second 
trader is then selected and given the option to either accept the current bid or ask or improve the 
bid-ask spread.10 Traders (selected at random) continue to improve the bid-ask spread until a trade 
occurs.11 This sequential trading in which one unit of the asset is traded at a time resembles the 
                                                          
7 This is calculated using the simulations presented in Section 4.4. In our model, learning cannot be immediate 
because traders update their beliefs only after observing an order.   
8 Relatedly, Pouget (2007) used simulations to study learning in markets with insiders. Our approach differs, 
however, because traders learn about the true value of the asset by inferring other traders’ information through 
orders. In Pouget (2007) traders learn to play certain strategies. 
9 A market maker (or a specialist) is commonly utilized in the market microstructure literature (e.g. Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987).  In order to model our experimental design as closely as possible we do 
not include a market maker in our model. 
10 A bid-ask spread is only updated when the newly selected trader has enough cash (shares) to cover the bid (ask) 
position. In line with our experimental markets, traders are not permitted to sell short or borrow funds. 
11 The sequence of trades is not random, however. Traders either will or will not trade at a given bid-ask spread 
depending upon their current belief regarding the true value of the asset. 
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classical Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model. If a trade occurs, then the price, 𝑝𝑝, is set at the 
current best bid (or ask) and the trading book is updated.12  
The decision of traders to improve the bid-ask spread or trade depends on their beliefs 
regarding the true asset value. Specifically, traders will improve the current bid-ask spread if 
their beliefs lie within the current spread. In that case, the updated bid (ask) will be drawn from a 
uniform distribution between the current bid (ask) and the trader’s belief. If traders’ beliefs are 
below (above) the current best bid (ask), then they would sell (buy) the asset. Trading thus 
follows, similar to our experimental design, a bid-ask improvement rule. 
In our market environment, traders observe market prices as well as bids and asks. We will thus 
assume that traders can use all orders as information to update their beliefs. The way they update 
their beliefs depends on their behavioral type.  
4.2. Behavioral types 
We define behavioral types based on traders’ learning limitations. The first limitation follows 
from a failure to perform Bayesian updating (e.g. Charness and Levin, 2009) (see Section 4.2.1 
below) and the second follows from a failure to gauge other traders’ behavioral types (e.g. 
Bazerman and Samuleson, 1983) (see Section 4.2.2 below).  
4.2.1. Reflective and non-reflective traders 
In line with quasi-Bayesian learning models proposed by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) and Rabin (2002), our framework considers people who differ in their ability to apply 
Bayes’ rule to new information.13 Unlike these prior studies, we consider a model in which 
                                                          
12 The accepted bid/ask is removed from the book, and the next best bid/ask, if one exists, becomes the current best 
bid/ask. 
13 Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) accounts for stock market under- and over- reaction to news by 
developing a model in which traders overvalue the precision of their private information and update their beliefs 
self-servingly by downplaying information which may not be consistent with their prior beliefs. Rabin (2002) 
considers the case in which investors assign too much weight to small samples to account for stock market under- 
and over- reaction to news. Both Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Rabin (2002) build their models 
on extensive cognitive psychology literature showing that people largely fail to apply Bayes’ rule suffering instead 
from a number of common and long-lasting biases (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Stanovich, 2009b; 
Khaneman, 2011). Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2015) provides a decisive argument challenging Bayesian 
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heterogeneous agents interact in the market. In particular, we assume our traders to either be 
reflective or non-reflective. Reflective traders apply Bayes’ rule to infer the true value of the asset 
as they observe orders (asset prices, bids and asks). Non-reflective traders only update their beliefs 
once, on the basis of their private information, and do not use orders to infer other traders’ private 
information. These identifying characteristics are consistent with two important models in the 
literature: the prior information model (Lintner, 1969) and the cursed equilibrium model (Eyster 
and Rabin, 2010; Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos, 2015). According to the former, traders make 
decisions based solely on their private information and fail to infer other traders’ information from 
market prices. Interestingly, Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015a) report extensive support for this 
model using a wealth of experimental asset market data. The behavior of traders in the prior 
information model closely relates to the widely-documented phenomenon of the winner’s curse 
(Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983; Thaler, 1988, 1991). The winner’s curse occurs when auction 
participants fail to anticipate the informational content of other peoples’ bids and end up paying 
too much for the auctioned item. Applied to financial markets, Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos (2015) 
refer to cursed traders as those who “neglect the informational content of prices.” Our model 
extends their work by providing a psychological profile, which crucially hinges on cognitive 
reflection, for cursed traders. 
As the CRT is a key determinant of an individual’s capacity to properly use Bayes’ rule, it is an 
appropriate measure of a trader’s ability to infer other traders’ information from prices. In line with 
previous works, we report that CRT scores correlate positively and significantly with Bayesian 
updating scores (r = 0.30, p-value = 0.02, n = 60).14,15  
4.2.2. Perceptive and non-perceptive traders 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
learning models by showing that people may not be naturally inclined to learn like Bayesians even when getting 
extensive opportunities to do so, such as in armed bandit tasks. 
14 We also confirm that our general measure of intelligence, the Raven test, correlates with Bayesian updating scores 
less strongly than CRT scores do (r = 0.22, p-value = 0.09, n = 60). In addition, when regressing Bayesian updating 
scores on both CRT and Raven scores, we report that only the coefficient associated to CRT scores reaches 
statistical significance (p-value = 0.01 for CRT scores, compared to p-value = 0.12 for Raven scores) (see Appendix 
D1). 
15 Along with CRT, we also use a Bayesian updating performance measure which was originally proposed by 
Charness and Levin (2009) (see Appendix A). 
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In our market environment, traders may incorrectly update their beliefs after observing orders 
either because they are not able to apply Bayes’ rule or because they hold wrong beliefs about 
other traders’ behavioral types. For example, reflective traders who believe that other traders are 
non-reflective will downplay the value of orders as accurate signals of other individuals’ 
information compared to traders who believe others are reflective. 
For the sake of our model, we define perceptive (non-perceptive) traders as those who know 
(do not know) the actual proportion of reflective traders in the market on trader performance. 
Following previous research on the role of intuition in financial markets (BQB), we view 
perceptive traders as those who have high theory of mind skills and are thus more likely to know 
others’ intentions and behavioral types. The role of theory of mind skills in capturing one’s 
ability to assess the level of sophistication of others also relates to a series of works linking 
theory of mind with an individual’s ability to reduce strategic uncertainty in two-player games 
(e.g. McCabe et al. 2001; Hampton et al. 2008; Ekins et al. 2013; Kimbrough, Robalino and 
Robson, 2016). These works stress that theory of mind skills are crucial in understanding and 
anticipating other players’ choices in games. In our setup, traders with high theory of mind skills 
will be more likely to infer others’ private information from their orders as they have a better 
assessment of their behavioral types than traders with low theory of mind skills. 
Non-reflective traders, whether they are perceptive or not, do not use orders to update their 
beliefs regarding the valuation of the asset.  Thus, we consider three distinct behavioral types: 
reflective and perceptive, reflective but non-perceptive, and non-reflective. 
Importantly, the measures we use for defining reflective (CRT) and perceptive (ToM) traders 
are not correlated (r = -0.03, p-value = 0.704). This is in line with our model which assumes that 
reflective and perceptive are two independent behavioral types. It follows that a reflective trader 
is equally likely to be either perceptive or non-perceptive. 
4.3. Learning 
In our model, learning occurs after each market event. Market events either correspond to an 
improvement of the bid-ask spread or to a transaction. Based on these market events, reflective 
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traders update their beliefs of the true value of the asset by applying Bayes’ rule to infer other 
traders’ information. By contrast, non-reflective traders do not update their beliefs relying 
entirely on their private information.16  
4.3.1. Prior beliefs and hints 
In line with our experimental market environment, traders receive a hint h ∈{“Not 50”, “Not 
490”, “Not 240”} before the market starts. We denote by 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛,ℎ𝜏𝜏  the belief of a trader of behavioral 
type 𝜏𝜏 after the  𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡ℎ market event and given hint ℎ, where 𝜏𝜏 ∈ {𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃,𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅} and 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 (𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃) [𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅] 
stands for a perceptive reflective (non-perceptive reflective) [non-reflective] trader. We will refer 
to all reflective traders, whether they are perceptive or non-perceptive, as 𝑅𝑅. 
It follows, applying Bayes’ rule that prior beliefs (before any market event takes place, that is 
𝑛𝑛 =  0) of all trader types are as follows: 𝜇𝜇0,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 50𝜏𝜏 = 316.9, 𝜇𝜇0,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 240𝜏𝜏 = 210 and 𝜇𝜇0,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 490𝜏𝜏 =156.9 for any 𝜏𝜏 ∈ {𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃,𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅}.  
4.3.2. Traders’ orders and beliefs updating 
We illustrate how traders update prior beliefs based on market events with an example. We 
consider a market solely populated by reflective traders in which the value of the asset is 240 
(see Appendix B for a more general description of the updating procedure and for a more 
detailed example). We consider three successive market events. 
First market event: bid-ask spread {200, 360} 
The first market event always corresponds to a trader setting a bid-ask spread. In our example, 
we consider this first bid-ask spread to be {𝑏𝑏1 = 200,𝑎𝑎1 = 360}, where bn (an) denote the bid 
(ask) associated to the nth market event. This bid-ask spread leads all reflective traders to update 
                                                          
16 Our framework can be extended by considering the general case in which non-reflective traders do not necessarily 
ignore orders, which is an extreme version of cursed trading (Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos, 2015). For example, one 
might define traders to be reflective-type η if they need to observe η orders consistent with a certain value of the 
asset before updating their belief accordingly. This extension of our model would relate to the works stressing the 
prominent role of inattention in financial decisions (e.g. Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden, 2003; Andersen et al. 2015). 
This also relates to Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2015) who suggest that individuals who have the ability to 
apply Bayes’ rule do not because of their lack of vigilance. 
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their beliefs upwards (see Figure 1, first market event). This is the case because a bid of 200 
could not have been posted by traders who hold the hint “Not 490” because they value the asset 
at 156.9. This leads traders to increase their belief that the value of the asset could be 490 thus 
increasing their belief regarding the valuation of the asset. At this point, reflective traders who 
are non-perceptive update their beliefs similarly to those who are perceptive because both 
reflective and non-reflective traders hold the same initial prior beliefs given a hint. Non-reflective 
traders do not update beliefs based on market events.  
 
 
Figure 1. Orders and evolution of traders’ beliefs (example). 
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Second market event: trade at 360 
Suppose the second market event corresponds to a transaction at the current ask price (𝑝𝑝2=360, 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 denotes the price at which the asset is traded in the 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡ℎ market event). Given traders’ 
beliefs, only reflective traders who hold the hint “Not 50” would have been buying the asset at 
360 because they are the only type of trader who value the asset at more than 360 (𝜇𝜇1,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 50𝑅𝑅 =376.4) (see Figure 1, first market event). It thus follows that all reflective traders learn from this 
second market event that the value of the asset cannot be 50. Reflective traders who hold the hint 
“Not 490” thus infer that the value of the asset must be 240 (𝜇𝜇2,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 490𝑅𝑅 = 240). However, 
reflective traders who already hold the hint “Not 50” learn nothing from this second market event 
(𝜇𝜇2,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 50𝑅𝑅 = 𝜇𝜇1,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 50𝑅𝑅 ). Given that the true value of the asset is 240, traders who hold the hint 
“Not 240” do not exist. However, reflective traders must keep track of the evolution of these 
traders’ beliefs because they do not know the true value of the asset at the beginning of the 
market and thus are unaware that these traders do not exist. Traders who hold the hint “Not 240” 
would infer from the second market event that the value of the asset is 490. 
Third market event: bid-ask spread {207, 350} 
Suppose the third market event consists of a trader posting a bid-ask spread {𝑏𝑏3 = 207,𝑎𝑎3 =350} which improves the current bid of 200 (which has not yet been taken) and provides a new 
ask (the previous ask of 360 has already been accepted). The only traders that can update beliefs 
at this point are the reflective traders who hold the hint “Not 50” because they have not yet 
discovered the true value of the asset. These reflective traders who are also perceptive know that 
the market is populated solely with reflective traders. Thus, they know that an ask of 350 is not 
compatible with the value of the asset being 490. This is the case because, had the value of the 
asset been 490, they would know that the traders populating the market (reflective traders 
holding either the hint “Not 50” or “Not 240”) value the asset at more than 350 (𝜇𝜇2,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 50𝑅𝑅 =376.4 and 𝜇𝜇2,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 240𝑅𝑅 = 490) (see Figure 1, second market event). It follows that perceptive 
reflective traders holding the hint “Not 50” learn that the true value of the asset is 240 (see Figure 
1, third market event). However, reflective traders who hold the hint “Not 50” do not infer the 
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true value of the asset from the posted ask of 350 if they are not perceptive. This is due to the 
fact that non-perceptive traders wrongly believe that some non-reflective traders populate the 
market in which case an ask of 350 is still compatible with the value of the asset being 490. This 
is so because non-reflective traders holding the hints “Not 50” and “Not 240” value the asset at 
less than 350. For example, if non-perceptive traders believe the proportion of reflective traders 
in the market is 25% (4 out of 12), then their belief regarding the true value of the asset is 356.4 
after observing the third market event.  
This example illustrates the learning procedure by which reflective traders can uncover the true 
value of the asset from orders and it shows why non-perceptive reflective traders may learn more 
slowly than perceptive reflective traders. 
4.4. Simulations and hypotheses  
We conduct simulations of the learning model to derive a series of hypotheses that can be tested 
experimentally. Each simulation is conducted with the same number of traders as in our 
experimental asset markets (12) and the same endowment of cash (1200 francs) and shares (4).17 
4.4.1. Simulation procedures 
Simulations were run for various combinations of three exogenous model parameters. The first 
parameter corresponds to the value of the asset ∈ {50, 240, 490}. The second parameter is the 
proportion of reflective traders (𝛼𝛼 ∈  { 2
12
, 3
12
, … ,1}) in the market.18 This proportion defines the 
ratio of each behavioral type in the market because we split reflective traders equally between the 
perceptive and non-perceptive types.19 The third parameter is the non-perceptive reflective traders’ 
belief regarding the proportion of reflective traders in the market (𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁  ∈   { 0
12
, 1
12
, … ,1}) where 
𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ≠ 𝛼𝛼). For each of the 429 combinations of our three parameters (𝑣𝑣,𝛼𝛼,𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) we perform 
                                                          
17 Our results are, however, robust to considering smaller or bigger markets as well as different endowments. These 
simulations are available upon request from the authors. 
18 We need at least 𝛼𝛼 = 2
12
 so that all three behavioral types are represented. 
19 For an odd number of reflective traders, each simulation randomly determines whether there is one more 
perceptive reflective trader or non-perceptive reflective trader in the market. Our results are robust to considering 
more uneven distributions of perceptive and non-perceptive traders. 
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25,000 simulations. Each simulation runs until 5 trades have been executed. Our results are, 
however, robust to different stopping rules.20  
We derive three hypotheses assessing differences in earnings, orders and shareholdings across 
behavioral types. 
4.4.2. Hypotheses 
In our model, traders who obtain the highest earnings are those who are able to most accurately 
learn others’ information from orders. As illustrated in Section 4.3, learning hinges on one’s 
capacity to be both reflective and perceptive. In addition, perceptive skills are only useful to 
those traders who attempt to uncover others’ information from orders. This implies that 
perceptive skills will only increase the earnings of reflective traders. That is, perceptive and 
reflective skills are complementary. 
In addition, the model points to situations in which trader skills are likely to be most relevant. 
This is the case, for example, when the market is populated by a low proportion of reflective 
traders. In that case, the competition between reflective traders for seizing non-reflective traders’ 
wealth is milder leading to higher earnings for reflective traders. Another important situation in 
which trader skills are especially relevant is the case in which traders receive an imprecise signal 
regarding the true value of the asset. This occurs when traders receive the hint “Not 240” in which 
case the signal does not provide clear guidance regarding the asset value (50 or 490). By contrast, 
the hints “Not 50” and “Not 490” provide clearer guidance to traders regarding the true value of 
the asset. In statistical terms, the signal “Not 240” is less precise than the signals “Not 50” and 
“Not 490”.21 In our model, the less precise a trader’s hint is the more there is to learn from orders 
about other traders’ hints. It follows that trader skills should matter the most when traders’ private 
information consists of imprecise signals of the true value of the asset (“Not 240”) than more 
precise signals (“Not 50” or “Not 490”). 
                                                          
20 For example, our results are robust to stopping the simulations after 30 trades which is the average number of 
trades observed in our experimental asset markets (results available from the authors). 
21 Given our market parameters (see Table 1), a trader receiving the hint “Not 240” believes the asset value can be 
either 50 or 490 with probability 63.6% and 36.4%. The standard deviation of the “Not 240” trader posterior belief 
is thus equal to 211.7 compared to 115.4 [94.3] in the case of “Not 50” [“Not 490”] traders. 
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Based upon our model’s predictions, we make the following hypothesis regarding traders’ 
earnings. 
Hypothesis 1 (Earnings).  
i) Reflective traders will earn more than non-reflective traders. This difference will be 
larger when the market is populated by a larger proportion of non-reflective traders. 
ii) Reflective traders who are perceptive will earn more than those reflective traders who 
are not perceptive. The difference in earnings between perceptive reflective and non-
reflective traders will be larger for traders who receive an imprecise hint (“Not 240”) 
than for those traders who receive a more precise hint (“Not 50” or “Not 490”).   
iii) Reflective and perceptive skills will be complementary in explaining trader earnings. 
Table B3.1 (Panel A) in Appendix B3 reports the results of our simulations regarding earnings 
comparisons across behavioral types supporting Hypothesis 1. In Figure B3.1 in Appendix B3, 
we also motivate the second part of Hypothesis 1i.  
In our model, high earners are those traders whose beliefs are more in line with the true value of 
the asset. We define an order to be consistent with the true value of the asset when a bid or a 
purchase (an ask or a sale) is lower (higher) than or equal to the true value of the asset. Hypothesis 
2 is structured to identify the impact of reflective and perceptive skills on the proportion of 
consistent orders submitted to the market. Similar to Hypothesis 1, we also expect the difference in 
the proportion of consistent orders between perceptive reflective traders and non-reflective traders 
to be most pronounced when they receive imprecise signals.22 We thus utilize our model to make 
the following hypothesis regarding traders’ orders consistency. 
Hypothesis 2 (Orders). 
i) Reflective traders will place a greater proportion of orders (bids, asks, purchases and 
sales) that are consistent with the true value of the asset than non-reflective traders. 
                                                          
22 We do not make predictions regarding market composition because markets populated by a large proportion of 
non-reflective traders may impede the learning process and thus lead to lower order consistency than markets 
populated by a small proportion of non-reflective traders. 
23 
   
 
ii) Reflective traders who are perceptive will place a greater proportion of orders that are 
consistent with the true value of the asset than those reflective traders who are not 
perceptive. The difference in the proportion of consistent orders between perceptive 
reflective and non-reflective traders will be larger for traders who receive an imprecise 
hint (“Not 240”) than for those traders who receive a more precise hint (“Not 50” or 
“Not 490”). 
iii) Reflective and perceptive skills will be complementary in explaining the proportion of 
consistent orders. 
Table B3.1 (Panel B) reports the results of our simulations regarding the consistency of traders’ 
orders across behavioral types and hints. These results support Hypothesis 2. 
In our model, high earners are more likely to learn the true value of the asset and thus hold more 
(less) shares at the end of the market when the asset is undervalued (overvalued). In particular, we 
expect skilled traders (those who are both reflective and perceptive) to hold less (more) shares than 
unskilled traders when the value of the asset is lower (higher) than the market price, which is the 
case when the value of the asset is 50 (490).23  
As above, our model enables us to make the following hypothesis regarding shareholdings. 
Hypothesis 3 (Shareholdings).  
i) Reflective traders will hold less [more] shares at the end of the market than non-
reflective traders when the actual value of the asset is low (50) [high (490)]. 
ii) Reflective traders who are perceptive will hold less [more] shares at the end of the 
market than those reflective traders who are not perceptive when the actual value of the 
asset is low (50) [high (490)].  
iii) Reflective and perceptive skills will be complementary in explaining traders’ 
shareholdings. 
                                                          
23 In our model, observed prices can never be below 50 or above 490.  
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Table B3.2 reports the results of our simulations for shareholdings across behavioral types and 
hints. These results support Hypothesis 3. 
5. Experimental results 
We analyze our experimental data for evidence supporting Hypotheses 1-3. To that end, our 
empirical definition of a reflective (non-reflective) trader is one who scores in the top (bottom) 
quartile on the CRT. We define perceptive (non-perceptive) traders as those who score in the top 
(bottom) quartile on the ToM test. 
Online Appendix O2 includes figures displaying the evolution of asset prices across the 17 
markets for each of the 17 sessions we conducted. 
5.1. Statistical method 
To investigate our hypotheses, we use linear panel regressions with random effects in which 
each subject is treated as a cross-section observation (n = 204) and each market as a time 
observation (t = 17).24,25 In each regression, we report robust standard errors clustered at the 
session level. We add treatment dummy variables controlling either for the type of endowment 
which was given to subjects (Loan Dummy) or for the stakes (High stakes Dummy). In the 
regressions using trader earnings as the dependent variable, the coefficients associated to the 
Loan Dummy should be negative because subjects earned less on average in those sessions 
($33.5) than in the baseline sessions ($48.0) in which they were given a $1.2 endowment each 
period. For the high stakes sessions, we divide subjects’ earnings by two so that average earnings 
are in line with those in the baseline. High stakes sessions closely resemble our baseline sessions 
when considering aggregate market variables (see Figure F5.1 in Appendix F5). For example, the 
mean absolute deviation of average prices with respect to the true value of the asset (the main 
measure of information aggregation used in PS) does not significantly differ between the 
                                                          
24 Fixed effects cannot be used since we are assessing the effect of time-invariant regressors (such as CRT) on trader 
performance. Also, using the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, we reject the hypothesis that random effects 
are not appropriate (p-values < 0.001 across all specifications used in the results section). 
25 In lieu of analyzing trader wealth by market, we could use average earnings across markets as our dependent 
variable. Despite substantially reducing the number of available observations, the use of average earnings yields 
results that are remarkably similar to those obtained via our panel data analysis (see Appendix F3). 
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baseline and high stakes sessions (p-value = 0.27, WRS). In Appendix F5, we also report no 
significant effect of high stakes sessions on our individual analysis of trader performance. For 
the sake of the main analysis, we thus pool the high stakes sessions with the other sessions. 
We also control for the actual value of the asset in a given market (Asset value) as well as for 
the hint received by the subject in a given market (“Not 50”, “Not 240” or “Not 490”). We 
expect regression coefficients associated to Asset value to be positive because subjects earned 
more in markets in which the value of the asset was higher. We control for gender by using a 
dummy variable that takes value one if the trader is a male and value zero otherwise (Male 
Dummy). We finally control for subjects’ IQ scores (Raven, 1941) and financial literacy scores 
(Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer, 2014). All individual measures are standardized to facilitate 
direct comparisons of the magnitudes of the coefficients associated to each of these variables. 
Given the moderate but significant correlation between CRT, ToM, Raven and financial 
literacy scores (see Table 2 below), we use orthogonalization techniques to deal with collinearity 
issues (Golub and Van Loan, 1996). The pattern of correlation in Table 2 is consistent with 
previous research.26 
Table 2. Correlation matrix for individual cognitive measures. 
 CRT ToM Raven 
ToM -0.030 _ _ 
Raven 0.298**** 0.211*** _ 
Financial literacy 0.353**** 0.076 0.192*** 
*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01 and ****p-value<0.001 
 n =204 for all pairwise correlations except those involving ToM in which case n = 167. 
We orthogonalize Raven and financial literacy scores with respect to CRT scores in all 
regressions in which ToM scores are not included. Likewise, we orthogonalize CRT, Raven and 
financial literacy scores with respect to ToM scores in all regressions in which both CRT and 
ToM scores are included. 
                                                          
26 Indeed, the significant positive correlation between Raven and CRT is consistent with Frederick (2005) whereas 
the significant positive correlation between Raven, CRT and financial literacy is also found in the financial literacy 
research (e.g. Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer, 2014). Finally, the significant positive correlation between Raven 
and ToM scores is in line with Ibanez et al. (2013). 
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In Appendix F, we provide extensive robustness checks, none of which are found to affect the 
nature of our findings. In Appendix F1, we add further individual controls to our regression 
analyses such as risk attitudes, educational background (school attended and grades) and 
personality traits (big five personality traits and self-monitoring scale). Session fixed effects are 
considered in Appendix F2. In Appendix F3, we define trader performance measures for the 
entire experiment abstracting away from the panel structure of our dataset. We also conduct 
additional panel regression analyses controlling for the possible serial correlation in the error 
term. In Appendix F4, we assess the robustness of our findings to the case in which dependent 
variables are not orthogonalized to deal with collinearity issues. The robustness of our findings 
to only using high stakes data is confirmed in Appendix F5. In Appendix F6, we conduct our 
analyses by defining the main predictors as deviations from the session average. 
5.2. Earnings 
In line with Hypotheses 1i and 1ii, we find that both CRT and ToM scores related positively to 
trader earnings. In Figure 2, we compare the earnings of traders in the bottom and top quartiles in 
terms of CRT and ToM scores.27 We observe that both CRT and ToM scores have a positive 
effect on earnings. The earnings gap is the largest when comparing traders in the bottom quartile 
($34.9) of both CRT and ToM scores with traders in the top quartile ($40.1). A trader who is in 
the top quartile of both CRT and ToM earns more than the top 25% of earners ($39.8) whereas a 
trader who is in the bottom quartile of both CRT and ToM earn as little as the bottom 25% 
earners ($34.5). We can also show that traders who are in the top 25% in both CRT and ToM 
outperform those who are in the top 25% according to either CRT (p-value = 0.045,WRS) or 
ToM scores (p-value = 0.046, WRS). 
                                                          
27 These quartiles are determined using participants scores in the current study. The quartile definitions are identical 
for both CRT (scores above 4 for top 25% and below 2 for bottom 25%) and ToM (scores above 28 for top 25% and 
below 25 for bottom 25%) if we use the whole pool of subjects registered at the lab instead of the participants in the 
current study. 
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Figure 2. Average trader earnings for participants in the bottom and top quartiles for CRT and 
ToM scores. We also represent the bottom quartile, median and top quartile for the whole 
distribution of participants’ earnings (see dashed horizontal lines).  
†P-values based on WRS comparing earnings of traders in the bottom and top quartiles of CRT, ToM and both CRT 
and ToM. *p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01 and ****p-value<0.001 
 
Hypothesis 1i (Reflective traders) 
Using panel regressions that control for market variables as well as specific characteristics of 
the individual traders, we show that, in line with Hypothesis 1i, CRT scores positively affect 
earnings (see CRT score in column [1] of Table 3). Reflective traders outperform non-reflective 
traders in terms of CRT (see CRT Top 25% Dummy in column [2], which takes value one if a 
trader’s CRT score is in the top 25% of participants). 
To test the second part of Hypothesis 1i, we calculate for each of the 17 sessions the ratio of 
bottom quartile CRT traders to top and bottom quartile CRT traders. We divide the sample 
between sessions which have a higher ratio of non-reflective traders than the median session and 
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those which have a lower ratio than the median session.28 We show that top quartile CRT traders 
outperform those in the bottom quartile only when the ratio of non-reflective traders in the 
market is higher than the median session (see column [3] and [4]) in Table 3). 
 Table 3. Trader earnings as a function of individual characteristics and market variables 
Earnings (in $)  
Sample: 
 
All 
 
[1] 
 
Top & Bottom 
25% CRT 
 [2] 
High ratio of 
non-reflective 
traders 
[3] 
Low ratio of 
non-reflective 
traders 
 [4] 
 
Intercept 
1,076.524**** 
(47.652) 
1,010.852**** 
(62.468) 
981.552**** 
(85.544) 
1,021.871**** 
(67.547)  
Hypothesized predictors      
CRT score 44.850*** 
(16.272) 
– – –  
CRT Top 25% Dummy – 
85.423** 
(43.272) 
117.146** 
(57.684) 
86.519 
(68.122)  
Controls – – – –  
Individual characteristics      
Raven score 
35.281 
(22.599) 
34.694 
(29.476) 
30.791 
(36.241) 
25.777 
(21.229)  
Financial literacy score 
4.505 
(12.771) 
2.922 
(22.136) 
45.569* 
(25.112) 
36.793 
(28.230) 
 
Male Dummy 
37.665* 
(33.173) 
84.157** 
(40.756) 
142.097** 
(64.116) 
41.159 
(46.891)  
Market characteristics      
Loan Dummy -879.488**** 
(23.809) 
-829.89**** 
(59.955) 
-718.661**** 
(47.747) 
-869.719**** 
(15.527) 
 
Hint “Not 50” Dummy29 
191.144**** 
(48.822) 
196.661**** 
(52.959) 
227.945*** 
(76.905) 
153.945** 
(70.625)  
Hint “Not 490” Dummy 
211.045**** 
(20.222) 
189.80**** 
(28.288) 
202.978**** 
(44.845) 
171.137**** 
(31.191) 
 
                                                          
28 Given that we conducted an uneven number of sessions (17), we cannot exactly split the two samples in half. We 
report results for the case in which there is one more session classified as having a high ratio of non-reflective 
traders. 
29 Both hint dummy variables (“Not 50” and “Not 490”) affect earnings positively and significantly in line with the 
fact that they offer a more precise signal than the hint “Not 240”. 
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Asset value 
3.834**** 
(0.132) 
3.908**** 
(0.149) 
3.871**** 
(0.251) 
3.951**** 
(0.132)  
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
n = 3,468 
0.000 
n = 2,193 
0.000 
n = 1,258 
0.000 
n = 935 
0.000  
R² 0.645 0.650 0.663 0.642  
*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01 and ****p-value<0.001   
 
In line with our model, markets which are populated by a larger ratio of non-reflective traders 
tend to exhibit higher levels of mispricing, defined as the absolute difference between the 
average market price and the true value of the asset. Indeed, mispricing is significantly higher in 
markets that have a higher ratio of non-reflective traders than the median market than in markets 
that have a lower ratio than the median market (137.26 vs. 125.17, p-value < 0.001, WRS). Thus, 
showing that reflective traders perform particularly well in sessions in which the ratio of non-
reflective traders is high implies that reflective traders tend to do well in markets in which 
mispricing is high. We purposefully state Hypothesis 1i in terms of the proportion of non-
reflective traders instead of the level of mispricing in the market because this proportion is 
exogenously determined in our model whereas mispricing is endogenous. 
Mispricing is also high in specific situations identified by Biais et al. (2005) as winner’s curse 
traps. Following Biais et al. (2005), we define winner’s curse traps as situations in which the true 
value of the asset is not 240, and the participant’s signal does not rule out 240. Winner’s curse 
traps manifest themselves in that context when prices are close to 240. In that case, traders are 
likely to wrongly infer that the true value of the asset is 240. The level of mispricing in Winner’s 
curse traps situations is significantly larger than otherwise (202.12 vs. 132.39, p-value < 0.001, 
WRS). In Appendix C1, we show that, in line with the Biais et al. (2005) findings, the positive 
effect of trader’s skills (CRT and ToM scores) tends to be most pronounced in Winner’s curse 
traps situations. 
Hypothesis 1ii and 1iii (Reflective and perceptive traders) 
In Table 4, we provide regression results that test Hypotheses 1ii and 1iii. We report a 
significantly positive effect of ToM scores on earnings in line with Hypothesis 1ii (columns [1] 
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to [5]). In particular, perceptive traders outperform non-perceptive traders (see ToM Top 25% 
Dummy in column [3]). 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1ii, we show that theory of minds skills positively affectthe 
earnings of reflective traders (see ToM scores coefficient in column [4]) whereas this effect is 
much less pronounced for non-reflective traders (see ToM scores coefficient in column [5]). 
Table 4. Trader earnings as a function of individual characteristics (including ToM) and market variables 
Earnings (in $)     
Sample: 
All 
 
[1] 
All 
 
[2] 
Top & Bottom 
25% ToM 
[3] 
Top 25% 
CRT 
[4] 
Bottom 25% 
CRT 
[5] 
Intercept 1,054.421**** (45.403) 
1,053.817**** 
(47.519) 
1,061.810**** 
(94.285) 
957.624**** 
(82.885) 
974.442**** 
(134.504) 
Hypothesized predictors      
ToM score 39.082*** (13.464) 
41.560**** 
(12.847) 
– 
77.033**** 
(23.195) 
46.116** 
(19.489) 
ToM Top 25% Dummy – – 128.402**** (31.568) – – 
ToM score × CRT score – 13.555 (12.802) – – – 
CRT score 44.517** (17.595) 
44.616*** 
(16.790) 
43.633** 
(21.366) 
142.996** 
(63.166) 
1.457 
(112.975) 
Controls      
Individual characteristics      
Raven score 45.040** (18.698) 
46.822** 
(18.749) 
40.319 
(27.110) 
41.871 
(30.279) 
44.211** 
(23.270) 
Financial literacy score 8.398 (14.511) 
8.605 
(14.535) 
5.432 
(20.400) 
-5.117 
(23.095) 
35.593 
(26.075) 
Male Dummy 74.916** (35.923) 
76.286** 
(36.374) 
115.988** 
(46.132) 
24.505 
(56.777) 
147.881*** 
(52.012) 
Market characteristics      
Loan Dummy -865.255**** (32.963) 
-864.649**** 
(32.365) 
-817.738**** 
(31.041) 
-971.786**** 
(42.289) 
-663.644**** 
(73.364) 
Hint “Not 50” Dummy 198.245**** (45.520) 
198.100**** 
(45.556) 
211.801*** 
(66.598) 
137.5868* 
(75.777) 
222.133**** 
(59.192) 
Hint “Not 490” Dummy 234.134**** (16.264) 
234.198**** 
(16.360) 
225.702**** 
(40.319) 
169.027**** 
(34.530) 
218.423**** 
(46.904) 
Asset value 3.808**** 3.808**** 3.485**** 4.000**** 3.765**** 
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(0.135) (0.135) (0.252) (0.180) (0.243) 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
n = 2,839 
0.000 
n = 2,839 
0.000 
n = 1,513 
0.000 
n = 1,020 
0.000 
n = 816 
0.000 
R² 0.650 0.651 0.644 0.667 0.661 
*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01 and ****p-value<0.001 
In line with Hypothesis 1ii, we also show that being a skilled trader (i.e., being reflective and 
perceptive) is most consequential when traders receive an imprecise hint (“Not 240”) (see 
Appendix C2). In a regression using trader earnings as the dependent variable, we find that the 
coefficient for the perceptive reflective trader dummy variable (which takes value one when a 
trader is both perceptive and reflective) reaches statistical significance (p-value < 0.01) when 
traders receive an imprecise hint (see Table C2.1, column [1] in Appendix C2). By contrast, the 
perceptive reflective trader dummy fails to reach standard statistical significance when traders 
receive more precise hints (p-value = 0.089) (see Table C2.1, column [2] in Appendix C2). 
Finally, we report directional evidence for Hypothesis 1iii as the interaction effect between 
ToM and CRT scores is positive (see ToM score × CRT score coefficient in Table 4 column [2]), 
but not statistically significant (p-value = 0.290). However, this ToM×CRT interaction effect is 
positive and significant when considering traders’ orders as well as shareholdings. 
5.3. Orders 
In line with the previous earnings results, we show that both CRT scores and ToM scores 
explain the consistency of traders’ orders. We illustrate our findings graphically below. 
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Figure 3. Average proportions of consistent orders for participants in the bottom and top 
quartiles for CRT and ToM scores. We also represent the bottom quartile, median and top 
quartile for the whole distribution of the proportion of consistent orders (see dashed horizontal 
lines). 
†P-values based on WRS comparing the proportion of consistent orders of bottom and top quartiles traders in terms 
of CRT, ToM, and both CRT and ToM. *p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01 and ****p-value<0.001 
 
In line with Hypothesis 2i, we find that reflective traders place a greater proportion of 
consistent trades than non-reflective traders (see Table C3.1 in Appendix C3). Confirming 
Hypothesis 2ii, we also report that perceptive reflective traders place more consistent orders than 
reflective traders who are not perceptive (see column [4] in Table C3.2 in Appendix C3). In line 
with our model, we find that the positive effect of ToM scores is limited to reflective traders (see 
columns [4] and [5] in Table C3.2). Importantly, we find, in line with Hypothesis 2iii, a positive 
and significant interaction effect between CRT and ToM scores in explaining the proportion of 
consistent trades (see column [2] in Table C3.2). Also in line with Hypothesis 2ii, we find that 
perceptive reflective traders place a significantly greater proportion of consistent orders than 
non-reflective traders when considering traders who receive the imprecise hint “Not 240” (p-
value = 0.013, see Appendix C2, Table C2.1, column [3]). This is not the case when considering 
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only traders who receive the more precise hints (“Not 50” or “Not 490”) (p-value = 0.254, see 
Appendix C2, Table C2.1, column [4]). 
We further assess the consistency of traders’ behavior with the true value of the asset by 
studying final shareholdings. 
5.4. Shareholdings 
In Figure C4.1 in Appendix C4 we compare shareholdings across behavioral types when the 
asset value is either 50 or 490. In line with Hypothesis 3i, reflective traders tend to hold less 
(more) shares at the end of the market than non-reflective traders when the asset value is low 
(high). The differences are not statistically significant, however. Hypothesis 3ii is supported as 
perceptive reflective traders hold less (more) shares than non-perceptive reflective traders when 
the asset value is low (high). This difference is only statistically significant when the true value 
of the asset is high. The lack of statistical significance of some of these basic comparisons may 
follow from the fact that we are considering separately low and high asset values leading to 
lesser statistical power. Thus, to highlight differences, we study shareholdings across behavioral 
types using the data from all market periods and combining the observations from markets in 
which the value of the asset is either 50 or 490. To that end, we define our dependent variable as 
being the net purchases [net sales] of certificates of traders in markets in which the value of the 
asset is 490 [50].30 This dependent variable captures the extent to which shareholdings at the end 
of the market are consistent with the true value of the asset. We refer to this variable as net 
holdings consistency. Following Hypotheses 3i and 3ii, we expect perceptive reflective traders to 
buy shares when the true value of the asset is high (490) and sell shares when the true value of 
the asset is low (50). We thus expect these traders to be characterized by a high level of net 
holdings consistency. 
In Table C4.1 (column [1]) in Appendix C4, we show that net holdings consistency is 
positively affected by CRT scores in line with Hypothesis 3i. In line with Hypothesis 3ii, we 
                                                          
30  Net purchases [sales] of shares are defined as: shareholdings at the end of the market - 4 [4 - shareholdings at the 
end of the market] where 4 reflects the initial endowment of shares. 
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show a significantly positive effect of ToM scores on net holdings consistency for reflective 
traders (see column [3]) which disappears for non-reflective traders (see column [4]). In addition, 
we observe, in line with Hypothesis 3iii, a positive and significant interaction effect between 
CRT and ToM scores in explaining net holdings consistency (see Table C4.1, column [2] in 
Appendix C4). 
 In Appendix D, we provide further analyses that test the soundness our model hypotheses. We 
also provide a separate analysis of gender effects in Appendix E. 
6. Conclusion: On the Role of Behavioral and Experimental Finance in Financial 
Education 
Our work shows that cognitive reflection and theory of mind skills are the main drivers of 
trader performance. Commonly-studied variables such as financial literacy, personality traits and 
risk attitudes play a lesser role in understanding trader performance. Our findings echo recent 
research in cognitive psychology stressing the limitations of current cognitive tests (e.g. Raven) 
to assess rational thinking, which is defined as one’s capacity to avoid behavioral biases and thus 
apply Bayes’ rule correctly (Stanovich, 2009). The author advocates the development of a 
rationality quotient (RQ) that would complement the commonly-measured IQ (Stanovich, 2016). 
To date, the best measure of RQ is provided by the CRT (Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2014). 
Our finding regarding the predominant role of RQ as opposed to IQ (Raven test) in explaining 
trader performance is consistent with the well-known observation of Warren Buffet (Loomis, 
2013, p. 101): 
“You don’t need a rocket scientist. Investing is not a game where the 160 IQ guy beats the 
guy with the 130 IQ... Rationality is essential...” 
Our results also support the recent move toward introducing Behavioral Finance findings in the 
standard Finance curriculum. For example, even though the CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst) 
curriculum emphasizes financial literacy, numeracy and computational ability, it has recently 
included a Behavioral Finance section.31 Given the many limitations and challenges people face 
                                                          
31 See http://www.businessinsider.com/cfa-level-3-behavioral-finance-2013-5 
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in undoing their own behavioral biases (e.g. Larrick, 2004), an important research topic is to 
gauge whether people can learn to avoid these biases the same way they learn financial concepts 
such as compounding and the time value of money. 
An interesting avenue for future research would be to design financial training programs that 
emphasize the importance of using orders as valuable signals about other traders’ private 
information. Such programs would, in addition to alerting participants to the negative financial 
consequences of behavioral biases, teach them how to avoid these biases. 
Our findings also show that cognitive reflection is not sufficient to achieve maximal trader 
performance thus leaving room for financial training based on social cognitive skills such as 
theory of mind. This would thus pave the way for a novel financial training program based on 
social cognitive skills.  
In that respect, we believe the experimental methodology could play a fundamental role by 
engaging people in market environments that reproduce relevant aspects of real markets without 
endangering their own wealth. In addition, another issue with learning financial principles in real 
markets is the large number of factors affecting asset prices that blur the individual participant’s 
responsibility in poor performance. Clear and unambiguous feedback on one’s own trading 
performance is a very appealing argument for the use of controlled market environments as a 
tool for financial education.32 Experience in these experimental markets could help subjects learn 
to suppress their behavioral biases and properly update their beliefs based on orders. Subjects 
might also learn to properly assess the proportion of robots belonging to each of the three 
behavioral types we have identified.  
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Internet Appendix 
 
Appendix A. Survey Description 
One-hour follow-up lab survey 
Extended cognitive reflection test (CRT): 
Taken from Frederick (2005): 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? ____ cents 
[Correct answer: 5 cents; intuitive answer: 10 cents] 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? ____ minutes 
[Correct answer: 5 minutes; intuitive answer: 100 minutes] 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long 
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? ____ days 
[Correct answer: 47 days; intuitive answer: 24 days] 
Taken from Toplack et al. (2014):  
(4) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one 
barrel of water together? _____ days  
[correct answer: 4 days; intuitive answer: 9] 
(5) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students are in the class? ______ students  
[correct answer: 29 students; intuitive answer: 30]  
(6) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90. How much has he made? _____ dollars 
[correct answer: $20; intuitive answer: $10]  
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(7) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had 
purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point, 
Simon has: a. broken even in the stock market, b. is ahead of where he began, c. has lost money 
[correct answer: c; intuitive response: b] 
Table A.1. Distribution of CRT scores 
CRT score % of subjects 
0 8.82 
1 18.62 
2 19.11 
3 17.65 
4 17.15 
5 6.85 
6 6.85 
7 4.95 
Mean 2.88 
Standard Deviation 1.89 
For each of the following tests, CRT, eye gaze and Raven, we asked participants to rank themselves as follows: “Out of the last ten people that 
took this test, how would you rank yourself: First, Second, …, Tenth.” 
Eye gaze test 
This is an example of one of the 36 questions in the test of Baron-Cohen (1997): 
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Figure A.1: Example of an eye gaze test question 
 
Table A.2. Distribution of eye gaze test scores 
 
 
 
Raven Test 
We utilized the Raven progressive matrices test (Raven, 1941) as a general measure of intelligence (Mackintosh, 2011). Specifically, we utilized 
the odd number of the last three series of matrices (Jaeggi et al. 2010). The duration of the test was 10 minutes. The number of matrices correctly 
Eye gaze score 0-9 10-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 >30 Mean Stand. 
Dev. 
% of subjects 4.19 0.00 5.39 21.56 55.68 13.18 25.86 6.24 
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solved in the Raven test is a conventional measure of cognitive ability. Measures of general intelligence are commonly related to working memory 
capacity, which refers to the short-term holding and manipulation of information (Conway, Kane and Engle, 2003). 
The following is an example of a Raven question: 
 
Figure A.2: Example of a Raven Test question 
Table A.3. Distribution of Raven scores (Study 1) 
Raven 
score 
<10 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
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Risk attitudes 
The risk elicitation task was taken from Holt and Laury (2002). The instructions were as follows.  
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How much you receive will depend partly on 
chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are not designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you would 
make in them. The only right answer is what you really would choose. For each line in the table on the right, please state whether you prefer 
option A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 10 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly selected for payment. Each line is 
equally likely to be chosen, so you should pay equal attention to the choice you make in every line. At the end of the experiment, a number 
between 1 and 10 will be randomly selected by the computer. This number determines which line is going to be paid. Your earnings for the 
selected line depend on which option you chose in that line: option A or option B. To determine your earnings, then, a second number between 1 
and 10 will be randomly selected by the computer. This number is then compared with the numbers in the line and option selected (see the table 
below). 
If the first number selects line 4: 
* If you selected option A you earn $2.00 if the second number is 1, 2, 3 or 4 and you earn $1.60 otherwise.  
* If you selected option B you earn $3.85 if the second number is 1, 2, 3 or 4 and you earn $0.10 otherwise.  
Table A.4. The ten binary lottery choices (Holt and Laury, 2002). 
Line OPTION A OPTION B 
1 1/10 of $2.00, 9/10 of $1.60 1/10 of $3.85, 9/10 of $0.10 
% of 
subjects 6.37 1.47 7.35 9.80 18.63 15.69 18.63 12.75 6.86 2.45 13.69 2.42 
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2 2/10 of $2.00, 8/10 of $1.60 2/10 of $3.85, 8/10 of $0.10 
3 3/10 of $2.00, 7/10 of $1.60 3/10 of $3.85, 7/10 of $0.10 
4 4/10 of $2.00, 6/10 of $1.60 4/10 of $3.85, 6/10 of $0.10 
5 5/10 of $2.00, 5/10 of $1.60 5/10 of $3.85, 5/10 of $0.10 
6 6/10 of $2.00, 4/10 of $1.60 6/10 of $3.85, 4/10 of $0.10 
7 7/10 of $2.00, 3/10 of $1.60 7/10 of $3.85, 3/10 of $0.10 
8 8/10 of $2.00, 2/10 of $1.60 8/10 of $3.85, 2/10 of $0.10 
9 9/10 of $2.00, 1/10 of $1.60 9/10 of $3.85, 1/10 of $0.10 
10 10/10 of $2.00, 0/10 of $1.60 10/10 of $3.85, 0/10 of $0.10 
 
Table A.5. Number of safe choices in the Holt and Laury task 
 
 
 
Personality traits 
The Big Five Inventory (John, Donahue and Kentle , 1991 and John, Naumann and Soto, 2008). 
Table A.6. Big five traits descriptive statistics 
Number of safe choices 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
% of subjects 4.19 2.40 1.20 6.59 19.75 17.36 26.35 16.16 2.40 1.80 1.80 4.95 2.02 
Variable α Mean Std. Dev. 
Openness .82 37.6 6.6 
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The following demographic information was collected: gender, age, school attended and GPA. Additional measures, such as the Wonderlic verbal 
test and adding skills (see Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2015b), were also collected. Inclusion of these variables in our robustness checks analyses 
(see Appendix F1) does not affect the qualitative nature of our results. 
 
End-of-experiment survey 
Financial literacy 
The scale was taken from Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer (2014). 
1) Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy:  
 more than today with the money in this account  
 exactly the same as today with the money in this account  
 less than today with the money in this account  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
 
2) Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Bonds are normally riskier than stocks.”  
 True  
 False  
Conscientiousness .80 32.2 5.4 
Extraversion .84 27.3 5.9 
Agreeableness .81 33.8 5.3 
Neuroticism .84 23.4 6.2 
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 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
 
3) Considering a long time period (for example 10 or 20 years), which asset described below normally gives the highest return?  
 savings accounts  
 stocks  
 bonds  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
 
4) Normally, which asset described below displays the highest fluctuations over time?  
 savings accounts  
 stocks  
 bonds  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
 
5) When an investor spreads his money among different assets, does the risk of losing a lot of money:  
 increase  
 decrease  
 stay the same  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
 
6) Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “If you were to invest $1000 in a stock mutual fund, it would be possible to have less 
than $1000 when you withdraw your money.” 
 True  
53 
   
 
 False  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
 
7) Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “A stock mutual fund combines the money of many investors to buy a variety of 
stocks.”  
 True  
 False  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
 
8) Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “After age 70 ½, you have to withdraw at least some money from your 401(k) plan or 
IRA.”  
 True  
 False  
 It depends on the type of IRA and/or 401(k) plan  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
 
9) Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “A 15-year mortgage typically requires higher monthly payments than a 30-year 
mortgage, but the total interest paid over the life of the loan will be less.”  
 True  
 False  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
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10) Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate is 20% per year and you never withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 
years, how much would you have on this account in total?  
 More than $200  
 Exactly $200  
 Less than $200  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
 
11) Which of the following statements is correct?  
 Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first year  
 Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and bonds  
 Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past performance  
 None of the above  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
 
12) Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys a bond of firm B:  
 He owns a part of firm B  
 He has lent money to firm B  
 He is liable for firm B’s debts  
 None of the above  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
 
13) Suppose you owe $3,000 on your credit card. You pay a minimum payment of $30 each month. At an Annual Percentage Rate of 12% (or 1% 
per month), how many years would it take to eliminate your credit card debt if you made no additional new charges?  
 less than 5 years  
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 between 5 and 10 years  
 between 10 and 15 years  
 never  
 Don’t know  
 Refuse to answer  
Table A.7. Distribution of financial literacy scores (Study 1) 
Financial literacy score 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
% of subjects 2.45 3.43 2.94 3.43 8.82 14.71 17.16 14.71 9.80 9.80 6.37 3.92 1.96 0.50 6.38 2.69 
 
Self-monitoring scale 
This scale is taken from Snyder and Gangestad (1986) and it was used by Biais et al. (2005). Subjects have to answer whether each of 18 
statements accurately describes their social behavior. We obtained a Cronbach alpha (0.71) similar to the one reported by Biais et al. (2005) (0.70). 
Subjects had 4 minutes to complete the test. 
For each of the following questions, we code 1 if the answer reflects self-monitoring and 0 otherwise. Our measure of the degree to which the 
participant is a self-monitor is the percentage of answers coded with a 1. 
Answer each Question by TRUE or FALSE: 
I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. 
At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like 
I can only argue for ideas, which I already believe. 
I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information. 
I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others. 
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I would probably make a good actor. 
In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention. 
In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons. 
I am not particularly good at making other people like me. 
I’m not always the person I appear to be. 
I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor. 
I have considered being an entertainer. 
I have never been good at games like charades or improvisations. 
I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations. 
At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going. 
I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should. 
I can look anyone in the eyes and tell a lie with a straight face. 
I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. 
 
Table A.8. Distribution of self-monitoring scores (Study 1) 
 
Bayesian updating test (collected in 5 high stakes sessions, n=60) 
Following Charness and Levin (2009) we use the following test.  
Self-monitoring 
score 0-3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
% of subjects 6.37 8.34 6.87 7.35 8.34 8.34 4.90 10.78 7.35 7.84 10.29 4.41 7.35 1.47 9.09 3.76 
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Consider two machines placed in two sides of large production hall, left side = L and right side = R. The two machines produce rings, good ones 
and bad ones. Each ring that comes from the left machine, L, has a 50 percent chance of being a good ring and a 50 percent chance of being a bad 
ring. Each ring that comes from the right machine, R, has a 75 percent chance of being a good ring and a 25 percent chance of being a bad ring. 
In each of the following four questions, you will observe some ring(s) that are the output of one of the two machines. After the information is 
given, you are asked to mark one (and only one) of the probabilities that you think is closest to the true probability that the L = left machine 
produced the ring(s), given your observations.  
Question 1. You observe one good ring. What is your best assessment of the probability that the left machine produced this ring (select the right 
answer)? 
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
 
Question 2. You observe one bad ring. What is your best assessment of the probability that the left machine produced this ring? 
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
 
Question 3. You observe six rings, and all six are bad. What is your best assessment of the probability that the left machine produced these rings? 
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
 
Question 4. You observe six rings, of which three are good and three are bad. What is your best assessment of the probability that the left machine 
produced these rings? 
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
 
Each question is scored by taking the absolute difference between a subject’s answer and the correct answer for each of the four questions. A 
subject’s final score is minus the sum of each question score. 
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Table A.9. Distribution Bayesian updating scores 
Bayes score [0-0.25) [0.25-0.50) [0.50-0.75) [0.75-1.00) [1.00-1.25) [1.25-1.50) >1.50 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
% of subjects 0 3.3 21.7 38.3 11.7 15 10 1.03 0.433 
We report a Cronbach alpha of 0.67 for this test.  
The Raven test and the CRT were also collected as in the one-hour lab survey.  
Question on session CRT ranking (collected in 4 high stakes sessions, n=48)33 
Participants were asked the following question: 
All of the participants in this experiment have taken a previous 7-question cognitive test. One example of a question was “A bat and a ball cost 
$1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” Out of the 12 people who participated in the current market 
experiment, where would you rank yourself in terms of this cognitive test? 
(1 means FIRST and 12 means LAST?) 
Table A.10. Distribution of perceived CRT ranks in a given session 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
% of 
subjects 
29.17 12.50 6.25 8.33 16.67 10.42 6.25 2.08 4.17 2.08 2.08 3.94 2.74 
 
                                                          
33 This question was asked to all 5 high stakes sessions but a technical issue made it impossible to collect the information for one session. 
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Appendix B. Model and hypotheses 
Appendix B1. Simulation procedure 
Reflective traders in our model use Bayes’ rule to update their belief of the asset’s true value 
after each market event. These events can be: (1) the current best bid is traded, (2) the current 
best ask is traded and (3) both the bid and the ask are (strictly) improved (i.e., no trade occurs). 
The updating rules for each event are described in this section. Consider the following notation: 
𝑣𝑣:  value of the asset 
𝜏𝜏:  traders’ behavioral type where 𝜏𝜏 ∈ {𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃,𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅} with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 (𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃) [𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅] signifying 
a perceptive reflective (non-perceptive reflective) [non-reflective] trader  
ℎ:  hint given to a trader; ℎ ∈{“Not 50”, “Not 240”, “Not 490”} (𝜏𝜏,ℎ):  trader group defined as a combination of a behavioral type and hint, e.g., (𝜏𝜏,ℎ) =(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝, "𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝 50") 
𝛼𝛼:  proportion of reflective traders in the market 
𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏:  represents the belief traders of type 𝜏𝜏 hold for 𝛼𝛼; note that 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 = 𝛼𝛼 for perceptive 
reflective traders while 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ≠ 𝛼𝛼 for non-perceptive reflective traders 
𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1:  current best bid at the time of event 𝑛𝑛 (a default bid of 50 is always present)
34 
𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1:  current best ask at the time of event 𝑛𝑛 (assume default ask of 490 is always 
present) 
𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛:  newly submitted bid corresponding to event 𝑛𝑛 (improves upon 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1) 
𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛:  newly submitted ask corresponding to event 𝑛𝑛 (improves upon 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1) 
𝑇𝑇(𝑁𝑁):  the current best offer, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 or 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, is traded 
𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇(𝑁𝑁): the current best offer, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 or 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, is not traded; so, the current best bid (ask) is 
improved, i.e. 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 > 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 < 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1) 
                                                          
34 Note that the current best bid (ask) at the time of event 𝑛𝑛 may not correspond to the 𝑛𝑛 − 1𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 bid (ask) submitted to 
the market due to events such as trades that do not update the bid (ask). Consider, for example, the bids in Figure 1. 
The initial default bid is 𝑏𝑏0 = 50. The first event updates this bid to 𝑏𝑏1 = 200. The second event is a transaction at 
the price 𝑝𝑝2 = 360. The third event corresponds to the submission of a new bid, 𝑏𝑏3 = 200, to the market. This new 
bid updates the current best bid, which is 200. Thus, in a situation like this we implicitly assume 𝑏𝑏2 = 𝑏𝑏1 = 200. 
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𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛): represents the 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡ℎ event; possible events are: (1) {𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1)}, (2) {𝑇𝑇(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)} and 
(3) {NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )⋂NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )}, i.e. the current bid-ask spread, (𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1), is 
improved to (𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛) 
𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛,ℎ𝜏𝜏 :  belief of trader of behavioral type 𝜏𝜏 with the hint ℎ after event 𝑛𝑛 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝ℎ
𝑣𝑣(𝑛𝑛 − 1): probability assigned to the true value, 𝑣𝑣, by the trader with the hint ℎ 
after the (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 event 
𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 (𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟):    upper (lower) bound of region 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 where 𝑝𝑝 ∈ {𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛} 
represents the current or newly submitted request to buy or sell. Regions are 
defined by the current beliefs of all trader groups and also depend upon the 
assumed asset value.35 Suppose that a reflective trader believes the asset’s value 
to be 50. Then four groups of traders exist: reflective with the hint “Not 240”, 
reflective with the hint “Not 490”, non-reflective with the hint “Not 240” and non-
reflective with the hint “Not 490.”36 The beliefs of these four groups of traders are 
used to discretize the interval [50,490] into at most 5 regions (less if the belief of 
one trader type coincides with that of another type or with one of the possible 
asset values, 240 or 490). 
𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎 = 𝑃𝑃[𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎] = 𝑃𝑃[𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎]  
𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏 = 𝑃𝑃[𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏] = 𝑃𝑃[𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏] 
 
We restrict bids and asks (and hence prices) to be in the interval [50,490] which has the 
minimum possible value of the asset as a lower bound and the maximum possible value of the 
asset as an upper bound. As noted in Section 4, traders make decisions to buy (sell) depending 
upon their belief of the asset’s value. If their belief is greater (less) than the current best ask 
(bid), then they will buy (sell) the asset provided they enough cash (at least one share). 
Otherwise, they will submit a new bid and ask that strictly improves the current bid-ask spread. 
The new bid is drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval 
�𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1, 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1,ℎ𝜏𝜏 �,𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛�𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1,𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1,ℎ𝜏𝜏 ��. 
                                                          
35 See, for example, Figure B2.1. 
36 The reflective trader only considers four groups as she assumes other reflective traders share her belief of the 
proportion of reflective traders in the market. Thus, if her type is perceptive reflective (non-perceptive reflective), 
she assumes other reflective traders are also perceptive (non-perceptive). 
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Without loss of generality suppose that after the 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡ℎ event, the trader with the hint “Not 240” 
updates her belief as follows37: 
𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 240𝑅𝑅 = = 𝐸𝐸�𝑣𝑣|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 240𝑅𝑅 , {𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}� = 𝑃𝑃[𝑣𝑣 = 50|{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}] × 50 + 𝑃𝑃[𝑣𝑣 = 490|{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}] × 490 
= 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50]𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝24050 (𝑛𝑛 − 1)
𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}] × 50 + 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490]𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝240490(𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}] × 490 
where 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50] × 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝24050 (𝑛𝑛 − 1) + 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490] × 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝240490(𝑛𝑛 − 1). 
We need to calculate 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣]. Let 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏 represent this trader’s belief of the asset value where 
𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 = 𝛼𝛼 for perceptive reflective traders while 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ≠ 𝛼𝛼 for non-perceptive reflective traders. 
There are three cases to consider. 
Case 1: the current best bid is traded, {𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}: = {𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1)} 
Suppose event 𝑛𝑛 corresponds to the acceptance of the current best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1. Then the 
conditional probability that event {𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1)} occurred, given the true value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣, is  
𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1   
To calculate the probability of selling in region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1  we consider the belief of each trader 
group.  Suppose 𝑣𝑣 = 50 in the above equation and set 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 equal to zero. If the belief of 
perceptive reflective (non-perceptive reflective) traders with the hint “Not 240” (“Not 490”) is 
                                                          
37 Note that when a reflective trader calculates a probability, it is assumed that the probability is determined given 
the trader’s hint. 
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less than or equal to the lower bound of the region, then add 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏/2 to 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 . Similarly, when 
considering whether non-reflective traders would sell in the region, we add (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏)/2 for each 
group.    
Case 2: the current best ask is traded, {𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}: = {𝑇𝑇(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)} 
Suppose the current best ask, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, is accepted.  Then the conditional probability that event {𝑇𝑇(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)} occurred, given the true value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣, is:  
𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1   
In this case we determine whether the belief of reflective (non-reflective) traders with the hint 
“Not 240” (“Not 490”) is greater than or equal to the upper bound of the region and add 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏/2 
([1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏]/2) to 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 .   
Case 3: both the current best bid and ask are improved, {𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}: = {NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )⋂NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )} 
Suppose neither the current best bid nor the current best ask is traded. Then both the bid and 
the ask are updated from the current best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1, and ask, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, to the new (improved) best 
bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛, and ask, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛. Then the conditional probability that event {𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)} = {NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )⋂NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )} occurred, given the true value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣, is: 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) ∩ NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )} |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1]= 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1]                                                         [𝑝𝑝]× 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )]                                     [𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝]× 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛  ∩  𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛�𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�                                     [𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝] 
Consider each term in this product separately. 
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[i] The first term is equivalent to one minus the probability that the current best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1, was 
not traded. This is equal to one minus the probability that traders are willing to sell in the region 
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1. Thus, we have: 
𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1] =  �1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1�. 
[ii] The second term may be rewritten as:  
𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )]= 1 − 𝑃𝑃[T(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )|𝑣𝑣, NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )]= 1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1|𝑣𝑣,𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1�= 1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1|𝑣𝑣,𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� × 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1�  = 1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1/𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1  
where we make use of Bayes’ rule as well as the fact that since 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 must lie to the right of (or 
possibly coincide with) 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 on the number line, 
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1|𝑣𝑣,𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� = 1. 
[iii] Finally, the third term may be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛  ⋂ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛�𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� = 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�  × 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1,𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛�
=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
�
𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1,ℎ𝜏𝜏 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� −𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(50, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1) �(𝜏𝜏,ℎ);
ℎ≠"𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑣𝑣" ⎦⎥
⎥
⎤
×
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
�
𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(490,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1) −𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1,ℎ𝜏𝜏 ,𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛��(𝜏𝜏,ℎ);
ℎ≠"𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑣𝑣" ⎦⎥
⎥
⎤
 
where the sums are taken over the four trader groups that did not receive the hint “Not 𝑣𝑣.” If the 
true value is assumed to be 50, then the four groups are: reflective traders with the hint “Not 
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240”, reflective traders with the hint “Not 490”, non-reflective traders with the hint “Not 240” 
and non-reflective traders with the hint “Not 490.” The variable 𝛾𝛾 is set to 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏 for reflective trader 
groups and (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏) for non-reflective trader groups (see Table B1.1).38  
Table B1.1. Proportion of traders from the perspective of a reflective trader with hint “Not 240” 
 Asset Value = 50 Asset Value =490 
 
 Hint, ℎ Hint, ℎ 
Behavioral type, 𝜏𝜏 “Not 240” “Not 490” “Not 50” “Not 240” 
Perceptive reflective, 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁/4 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁/4 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁/4 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁/4 
Non-perceptive reflective, 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁/4 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁/4 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁/4 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁/4 
Non-reflective, 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏)/2 (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏)/2 (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏)/2 (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏)/2 
As noted above, 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 = 𝛼𝛼 for perceptive reflective traders while 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ≠ 𝛼𝛼 for non-perceptive 
reflective traders. Each cell corresponds to a trader group.  There are nine total trader groups, though only six exist 
given the true value of the asset. 
 
Thus, we have  
𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = �1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1� × �1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1
𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1
� ×
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
�
𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1,ℎ𝜏𝜏 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(50, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1) �(𝜏𝜏,ℎ);
ℎ≠"𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑣𝑣" ⎦⎥
⎥
⎤
×
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
�
𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ,𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(490,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1) −𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1,ℎ𝜏𝜏 ,𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛��(𝜏𝜏,ℎ);
ℎ≠"𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑣𝑣" ⎦⎥
⎥
⎤
 
                                                          
38 If there exists an odd number of traders, then the assumption is that traders are split as evenly as possible across 
the different types so that, at most, there exists one more trader of a certain type.  For example, if 𝛼𝛼 = 5/12, then 
there might be two perceptive reflective traders and three non-perceptive reflective traders. In addition, if the asset 
value is assumed to be 50, then one of the non-perceptive reflective traders might receive the clue “Not 240”, while 
the other two receive the clue “Not 490”. 
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when the 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡ℎ event is an improvement to the bid-ask spread.39 As previously noted, reflective 
traders assume other reflective traders share their assessment of the proportion of reflective 
traders in the market. Thus, the belief updates for perceptive reflective and non-perceptive 
reflective traders may differ as demonstrated in the example in the main text. 
Appendix B2. Simulation example 
We illustrate our model by providing a more general example than the one provided in the 
main text (Section 4.3) where the market is populated by both reflective and non-reflective 
traders. In particular, we consider the case in which there are four reflective traders in the market. 
Thus, 𝛼𝛼 = 4/12, while non-perceptive reflective traders assume the proportion of reflective 
traders in the market is 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 9/12. The true value of the asset is set to 240. As such, the 
exogenous parameters for this simulation example are: (𝑣𝑣,𝛼𝛼,𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) = (240, 4/12, 9/12). 
Based on their prior information (“Not 50”, “Not 490” or “Not 240”), reflective traders’ initial 
beliefs regarding the value of the asset are: 𝜇𝜇0,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 50𝑅𝑅 = 316.9, 𝜇𝜇0,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 490𝑅𝑅 = 156.9 and 
𝜇𝜇0,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 240𝑅𝑅 = 210, where 𝜇𝜇0,ℎ𝑅𝑅  represents the belief of reflective traders who received the hint ℎ 
prior to the occurrence of any order.40 Non-reflective traders’ prior beliefs are the same as those 
of reflective traders: 𝜇𝜇0,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 50𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 316.9, 𝜇𝜇0,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 490𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 156.9 and 𝜇𝜇0,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 240𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 210.  
First market event: bid-ask spread {76, 332} 
Let us consider traders with the hint “Not 50”.41 Suppose the first trader submits an initial bid 
and ask spread of {𝑏𝑏1 = 76,𝑎𝑎1 = 332}. Both reflective traders with the “Not 50” hint will update 
their belief to 327.71 by applying the following Bayesian formula: 
                                                          
39 Strictly speaking, there exist cases in which only the bid or the ask is improved. However, we assume traders do 
not update their beliefs on these unlikely events. These cases occur, for example, when a trader wants to update both 
the bid and the ask, but does not have the requisite amount of cash/shares to cover the updated bid/ask as well as any 
outstanding bids/asks the trader might have. 
40 As the true value of the asset is assumed to be 240, there are no traders with the hint “Not 240” in the market. 
However, this fact is not known by the reflective traders who must therefore act as if traders with the hint “Not 240” 
could potentially exist. 
41 The updating rules for other traders and other possible asset values are similar. 
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𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 50𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240]𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝50240(𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}]  240 + 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490]𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝50490(𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}]  490 
where n would be one and 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240] × 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝50240(𝑛𝑛 − 1) + 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 =490] × 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝50490(𝑛𝑛 − 1). The initial prior probabilities are 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝50240(0) = 0.45/0.65 and 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝50
490(0) = 0.20/0.65, respectively. 
As traders received the hint “Not 50”, they know the value is either 240 or 490. Thus, it 
remains to calculate 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(1)}|𝑣𝑣] for 𝑣𝑣 ∈ {240,490}. This probability is equal to the probability 
that neither the current best bid nor the current best ask was traded given the value 𝑣𝑣.42 In this 
case the probability of the {76, 332} bid-ask pair is equal to the following: 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(1)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{NT(𝑏𝑏0 ) ∩ NT(𝑎𝑎0 )} |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0 ,𝑎𝑎0] = 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑏𝑏0 ) |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0] × 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑎𝑎0 )|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0, NT(𝑏𝑏0 )] × 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 ∩ 𝑎𝑎1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1�𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0�            = 𝑃𝑃[ 𝑏𝑏1 > 𝑏𝑏0|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0]  × 𝑃𝑃[𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎0 |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0, 𝑏𝑏1 > 𝑏𝑏0]  × 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1  ⋂ 𝑎𝑎1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1�𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0�     (1) 
where the default initial bid, 𝑏𝑏0, is set to 50 and the default ask, 𝑎𝑎0, is 490. 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 represent 
the regions in which the new bid (76) and new ask (332) reside. We assume all bids and asks, 
and hence prices, reside in the interval [50,490]. This interval is then divided into regions 
determined by the traders’ beliefs as depicted in the upper panel of Figure B2.1.   
 
                                                          
42 As previously noted in Appendix B1, this probability is equal to the product of three terms: (1) probability that the 
bid was not accepted given the value 𝑣𝑣, (2) probability that the ask was not accepted given the value 𝑣𝑣 and the event 
that the bid was not traded and (3) probability that the new bid and ask lie in their respective regions. 
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Figure B2.1. Representation of traders’ beliefs before (upper panel) and after (lower panel) the initial bid-
ask improvement event. The regions identified as 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 and 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 assume the true value of the asset is 240. 
 
In words, equation (1) indicates that the probability of the bid-ask improvement given the true 
value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣 is equal to the product of the following terms: 
[i]   The probability that the new bid improves the old bid given the value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣, and 
given the old bid-ask pair. 
[ii]  The probability that the new ask improves the old ask given the value, 𝑣𝑣, the old bid-ask pair (𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0), and that the new bid improves the old bid. 
[iii] The probability that the new bid resides in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,156.9] ([50,210]) and the 
new ask is in 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 = [316.9,490] given the value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣 = 240 (490), and given 
the old bid-ask pair. 
We address each term in the product in order. Assume the true value is 240 (490).  The term [i] 
is equivalent to one minus the probability that a bid in the region [50,156.9] ([50,210]) was 
accepted/traded (i.e., one minus the probability of a trader selling in this region).  Reflective 
traders assess this probability to be one, since all traders’ beliefs are greater than 156.9 (210). 
The difference between regions when assuming the true value is 240 or 490 is due to the fact that 
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if the true value is assumed to be 240 (490), then no traders with the hint “Not 240” (“Not 490”) 
exist.  
The term [ii] is equivalent to one minus the ratio of the probability that a trader buys in the 
region [316.9,490] to the probability that a trader buys in the region [50,156.9] ([50,210] if the 
true value is assumed to be 490).  From the upper panel in Figure B2.1 (first market event) it is 
clear that no trader is willing to buy in the former region, while all traders would seek to 
purchase the asset in the latter region.  Thus, this term also equals one. 
Finally, the term [iii] consists of a product of two sums. The first sum is the probability of a 
trader buying in the region containing the new bid, which is equivalent to the probability that a 
trader would submit a bid in that region (i.e., her belief is greater than the upper bound of the 
region). The second sum, the probability of a trader selling in the region containing the new ask 
given the new bid, is calculated in the same manner. The reflective trader with hint “Not 50” 
knows the true value is either 240 or 490.  Assuming it is 240, [iii] is calculated as follows: 
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
�
𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 ,𝑎𝑎0� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 , 𝑏𝑏0�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛�𝜇𝜇0,ℎ𝜏𝜏 ,𝑎𝑎0� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(50,𝑏𝑏0) �(𝜏𝜏,ℎ);
ℎ≠"𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑣𝑣" ⎦⎥
⎥
⎤ ×
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
�
𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 ,𝑎𝑎0� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 , 𝑏𝑏1�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(490,𝑎𝑎0) −𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇0,ℎ𝜏𝜏 ,𝑏𝑏1� �(𝜏𝜏,ℎ);
ℎ≠"𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑣𝑣" ⎦⎥
⎥
⎤
 
If the trader group, being considered involves reflective traders, then the variable 𝛾𝛾 is set to 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏, 
𝜏𝜏 = 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 for perceptive or 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 for non-perceptive traders. If the trader group being considered 
involves non-reflective traders, then the variable 𝛾𝛾 is set to (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏). When updating the belief of 
the perceptive reflective trader, 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏 is equal to 4/12 (𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 = 𝛼𝛼); whereas 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏 equals 9/12 (𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) for 
the non-perceptive reflective trader in this example. 
The assumption that reflective traders believe other reflective traders share their belief of the 
proportion of reflective traders in the market impacts a trader’s assessment of others’ beliefs. 
Assume the true value of the asset is 240 and consider the perspective of the perceptive reflective 
trader with the hint “Not 50.” To calculate 𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(1)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240], this trader must account for the 
beliefs of four groups of traders: reflective traders with the hint “Not 50”, reflective traders with 
the hint “Not 490”, non-reflective traders with the hint “Not 50” and non-reflective traders with 
the hint “Not 490”.  Regions 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 are determined by the location of the new bid and new 
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ask and are set to [50,156.9] and [316.9,490], respectively (see upper panel in Figure B2.1, first 
market event). As we assume the true value is 240, note that no traders with the hint “Not 240” 
would exist. 
Assuming the true value is 240, the probability that a reflective trader with the hint “Not 50” 
placed the bid, 𝑏𝑏1, in the region [50,156.9] is the proportion of such traders, 
𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏
2
, multiplied by 
�
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛�𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1
,𝑎𝑎0�−𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 ,𝑏𝑏0�
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛�𝜇𝜇0,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 50𝑅𝑅 ,𝑎𝑎0�−𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(50,𝑏𝑏0)� = 156.9−50316.9−50. The probability that a non-reflective trader with the hint 
“Not 50” placed such a bid is given by  1−𝛼𝛼
𝜏𝜏
2
 multiplied by 156.9−50
316.9−50. Similarly, the probability that 
a reflective trader with the hint “Not 490” placed the bid in this region is given by 𝛼𝛼
𝜏𝜏
2
156.9−50
156.9−50, 
while the probability that this resulted from the action of a non-reflective trader with hint “Not 
490” is given by 1−𝛼𝛼
𝜏𝜏
2
156.9−50
156.9−50. The probability that the bid was placed in this region given the 
true value of the asset is 240 is the sum of these terms. 
Analogously, the probability that a trader with the hint “Not 50” placed the ask, 𝑎𝑎1, in the 
region [316.9,490] given the new bid is 1
2
�
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛�𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 ,𝑎𝑎0�−𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 ,𝑏𝑏1�
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛(490,𝑎𝑎0)−𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇0,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 50𝜏𝜏 ,𝑏𝑏1�� = 12 490−316.9490−316.9 where we 
have taken advantage of the fact that the reflective and non-reflective traders with the same hint 
initially hold the same belief so that 𝛼𝛼
𝜏𝜏
2
+ (1−𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏)
2
= 1
2
. The corresponding probability for traders 
with the hint “Not 490” is 1
2
490−316.9
490−156.9. 
This allows one to calculate the term [iii] as: 
�
12 �156.9 − 50316.9 − 50� + 12 �156.9 − 50156.9 − 50�� × �12 �490 − 316.9490 − 316.9� + 12 �490 − 316.9490 − 156.9�� = 0.53. 
A similar calculation yields 0.65 when the perceptive reflective trader with the hint “Not 50” 
assumes the true value is 490.  Thus, this trader updates her belief to: 
𝜇𝜇1,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 50𝑅𝑅 = (1)(1)(0.53)(0.45/0.65)(0.53)(0.45/0.65) + (0.65)(0.2/0.65)  240 + (1)(1)(0.65)(0.2/0.65)(0.53)(0.45/0.65) + (0.65)(0.2/0.65)  490= 327.7 
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As the reflective and non-reflective traders with the same hints share the same initial belief, this 
first update is independent of the traders’ belief of the proportion of reflective traders in the 
market (i.e., there is no difference between the updates of perceptive reflective and non-
perceptive reflective traders).  Following the same process outlined above, reflective traders with 
the hint “Not 490” (“Not 240”) update their beliefs from 156.9 (210) to 139.5 (193). Recall that 
the non-reflective traders do not update their beliefs (see lower panel in Figure B2.1, second 
market event). 
Second market event: bid-ask spread {178, 321} 
The second randomly selected trader will not accept the bid or ask, as all traders’ beliefs reside 
within the bid-ask spread {76, 332} (see upper panel in Figure B2.1, first market event). Suppose 
the selected trader improves the spread to {178, 321}.43 The belief updates will now depend 
upon the reflective traders’ belief of the proportion of reflective traders in the market. Indeed, 
consider the perceptive reflective trader with the hint “Not 50”.  We again must calculate [i], [ii] 
and [iii] defined above. Assume the true value is 240 so that the regions of interest are as 
depicted in the lower panel of Figure B2.1. The probability that a bid in the region [50,139.5] 
would be accepted is zero as all traders’ beliefs are greater than 139.5. Thus, the term [i] is equal 
to 1. The probability that an ask in the region [327.7,490] would be accepted is also zero as all 
traders’ beliefs are less than or equal to 327.7. Thus, term [ii] is equal to 1. It remains to calculate 
[iii]. 
The probability that a reflective trader with the hint “Not 50” placed the bid, 𝑏𝑏2 = 178, in the 
region [156.9,316.9] is the proportion of such traders, 𝛼𝛼
𝜏𝜏
2
, multiplied by 
�
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛�𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏2
,𝑎𝑎1�−𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏2 ,𝑏𝑏1�
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛�𝜇𝜇1,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 50𝑅𝑅 ,𝑎𝑎1�−𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(50,𝑏𝑏1)� = 316.9−156.9327.7−76 . The probability that a non-reflective trader with the 
hint “Not 50” placed such a bid is given by 1−𝛼𝛼
𝜏𝜏
2
 multiplied by 316.9−156.9
316.9−76 . The probability that a 
reflective trader with the hint “Not 490” placed the bid in this region is zero since her belief of 
                                                          
43 Note that this second trader cannot be a reflective trader with the hint “Not 50,” as the updated ask of 321 is less 
than the belief of the reflective traders with the hint “Not 50”.  
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the true value is less than the upper bound of the region. The corresponding probability for the 
non-reflective trader with hint “Not 490” is also zero for the same reason. The probability that 
the bid was placed in this region given the true value of 240 is the sum of these terms. 
Analogously, the probability that a reflective trader with the hint “Not 50” placed the ask, 
𝑎𝑎2 = 321, in the region [316.9,327.7] given the bid of 178 is zero as her belief is greater than the 
lower bound of the region. The probability that a non-reflective trader with the hint “Not 50” 
placed such an ask is given by 1−𝛼𝛼
𝜏𝜏
2
�
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛�𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎2 ,𝑎𝑎1�−𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎2 ,𝑏𝑏2�
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛(490,𝑎𝑎1)−𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇1,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 50𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 ,𝑏𝑏2�� = 1−𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏2 327.7−316.9332−316.9 . Similarly, 
the probability that a reflective trader with the hint “Not 490” placed the ask in this region is 
𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏
2
327.7−316.9
332−178
, while the probability that a non-reflective trader with the hint “Not 490” submitted 
this ask is 1−𝛼𝛼
𝜏𝜏
2
327.7−316.9
332−178
.  Thus, term [iii] is calculated as: 
�
𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏2 �316.9 − 156.9327.7 − 76 � +  1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏2 �316.9 − 156.9316.9 − 76 � + 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏2 (0) + 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏2 (0)�× �𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏2 (0) + 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏2 �327.7 − 316.9332 − 316.9 � + 12 �327.7 − 316.9332 − 178 �� = 0.196 
where 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 = 4/12. A similar calculation yields 0.0896 when the perceptive reflective 
trader with the hint “Not 50” assumes the true value is 490.44 Thus, this trader updates her belief 
to: 
𝜇𝜇2,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 50𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 = (1)(1)(0.0896)(0.65)(0.0896)(0.65) + (0.196)(0.35)  240 + (1)(1)(0.196)(0.35)(0.0896)(0.65) + (0.196)(0.35)  490 = 375.5 
where 0.65 (0.35) is the prior probability that the value is 240 (490). Note that the trader’s belief 
of the actual proportion of reflective traders in the market matters in this case. Indeed, given 
𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 9/12 for the non-perceptive reflective trader, her updated belief of the asset value is 
379.4. Note that both traders updated their beliefs in the “wrong” direction. Similarly, the 
perceptive reflective trader with the hint “Not 490” updated her belief to 124.5, while the non-
                                                          
44 If the true value is assumed to be 490, then traders with the hint “Not 490” would not exist.  Thus, the region in 
which the bid of 178 resides would be [50,193] instead of [156.9,316.9].  Similarly, in the calculation of term [i] the 
region in which the bid of 76 resides would be [50,193] instead of [50,139.5].  
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perceptive reflective trader with the hint “Not 490” revised her belief to 91.6. The traders’ 
updated beliefs are reflected in Figure B2.2. 
 
Figure B2.2. Representation of perceptive reflective (upper panel) and non-perceptive reflective (lower 
panel) traders’ beliefs after the second bid-ask improvement event. The regions identified as 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏 assume 
the true value of the asset is 240. 
Third market event: sale at 178 
To conclude this descriptive example, suppose the bid of 178 is accepted by the third randomly 
selected trader. Consider the perspective of the perceptive reflective trader with the hint “Not 
50.”  She updates her belief as follows: 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(3)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏2)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏2|𝑣𝑣� = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏2  
To calculate the probability of selling in region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏2, set 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏2 = 0 and consider the belief of each 
trader group. Suppose the true value of the asset is 240. If the belief of reflective (non-reflective) 
traders with the hint “Not 50” is less than or equal to the lower bound of the region within which 
the current best bid of 178 resides, i.e. [156.9,316.9], then add 𝛼𝛼
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃
2
= 4/12
2
 (1−𝛼𝛼
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃
2
= 8/12
2
) to 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏2 . 
We proceed similarly, for traders with the hint “Not 490.” 
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 Thus,  
𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(3)}|240] = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏2 = 12 
as both reflective and non-reflective traders with the hint “Not 490” would be willing to sell in 
this region while traders with the hint “Not 50” would not. Analogously, if we assume the true 
value of the asset is 490, then: 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑝𝑝(3)}|490] = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏2 = 0 
for the region [50,210] (see the upper panel in Figure B2.2). Thus, the perceptive reflective trader 
with the hint “Not 50” learns the true value is 240. However, the non-perceptive reflective trader 
with hint “Not 50” fails to learn the true value of the asset updating her belief to: 
𝜇𝜇3,50𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = (1/2)(0.443)(1/2)(0.443) + (3/8)(0.557)  240 + (3/8)(0.557)(1/2)(0.443) + (3/8)(0.557)  490 = 361.5. 
 The perceptive reflective trader with the hint “Not 490” updates her belief to 124.5, and her non-
perceptive reflective counterpart updates her belief to 76.3. Thus, this example demonstrates the 
importance of a trader’s ability to accurately perceive the proportion of reflective traders in the 
market (compare the upper and lower panels in Figure B2.3). 
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Figure B2.3. Representation of perceptive reflective (upper panel) and non-perceptive reflective (lower 
panel) traders’ beliefs after the first transaction. 
 
Note that the new current best bid is 76 (this is the case because, as in the experiment, we do 
not clear the order book after a transaction), while the current best ask remains 321. The 
simulation would continue with the random selection of a fourth trader. 
Appendix B3. Simulations and hypotheses45 
Table B3.1. Average results of 25,000 simulations for each (𝑣𝑣,𝛼𝛼,𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) for earnings and 
proportion of consistent orders across behavioral types and hints (Hypotheses 1 and 2) 
 (A) (B) 
 
 
Earnings 
(francs) 
Proportion  
of consistent orders 
Behavioral type All hints   Hint “Not 240” 
Hint 
“Not 50” 
 “Not 490” 
All hints   Hint “Not 240” 
Hint 
“Not 50” 
 “Not 490” 
Perceptive reflective 2,269.25 2,311.75 2,247.97 0.814 0.832 0.812 
Non-perceptive reflective 2,265.07 2,307.20 2,244.00 0.795 0.821 0.790 
Non-reflective 2,210.32 2,172.78 2,229.65 0.442 0.259 0.544 
The number in each cell corresponding to a reflective trader (first two rows) reflects the average value across 3 × 11 × 13 ×25,000 simulations. As non-reflective traders do not exist when 𝛼𝛼 = 12/12, the last row reports average values across 3 ×10 × 13 × 25,000 simulations 
                                                          
45 The simulation program was coded in Matlab and is available upon request from the authors. 
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Figure B3.1. Earnings (in francs) of reflective (upper curve) and non-reflective traders (dotted 
lower curve) as a function of the proportion of reflective traders in the market (Hypothesis 1i) 
ranging from 2
12
  to 11
12
 to make sure all three behavioral types are present in the market. 
 
Table B3.2. Average results of 25,000 simulations for each (𝑣𝑣,𝛼𝛼,𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) combination for 
shareholdings at the end of the market across behavioral types and asset value (Hypothesis 3) 
Behavioral type 𝑣𝑣 = 50 𝑣𝑣 = 490 
Perceptive reflective 3.65 4.32 
Non-perceptive reflective 3.69 4.28 
Non-reflective 4.45 3.59 
 2,190  
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 2,230  
 2,250  
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 2,290  
 2,310  
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Appendix C. Additional analyses 
Appendix C1. Winner’s curse traps 
We define winner’s curse traps following Biais et al. (2005) by considering situations in which 
the true value of the asset is not 240, and the participant’s signal does not rule out 240. In this 
case winner’s curse traps manifest themselves when prices are close to 240 as agents are likely to 
wrongly infer that the true value of the asset is 240. Because the authors used an opening call 
auction in a large number of their experimental sessions they considered that a winner’s curse 
trap existed when the opening call auction price was strictly larger than 220 and lower than or 
equal to 260. We adapt this working definition to our continuous double auction design by 
defining the winner’s curse trap situation as one in which average prices were between 220 and 
260 in the first minute of each market period. We report our findings in Table C1.1 below. We 
report our findings for this definition of winner’s curse traps as well as for a slightly broader 
definition that includes first-minute prices between 200 and 280. We do so because, using the 
original definition only 31.0% of first-minute prices fall into the range [220-260] compared to 
44.6% for the range [200-280]. However, the qualitative nature of the results is unaffected by the 
price range choice. Our findings are in line with Biais et al. (2005). 
 
Table C1.1. Trader earnings as a function of individual characteristics and market variables 
Earnings (in $)  
Sample: 
Winner’s curse 
trap 
[220-260] 
No Winner’s 
curse trap 
[220-260] 
Winner’s 
curse trap 
[200-280] 
No Winner’s 
curse trap 
[200-280] 
Intercept 1,173.308**** (99.318) 
1,041.564**** 
(50.228) 
1,183.284**** 
(67.167) 
1,057.102**** 
(51.889) 
Hypothesized predictors     
ToM Top 25% Dummy 277.870** (144.928) 
82.107*** 
(27.862) 
289.02*** 
(110.436) 
63.876** 
(30.545) 
Controls     
Individual characteristics     
CRT score 101.373* (53.180) 
39.613** 
(17.693) 
70.766* 
(40.278) 
42.347** 
(18.395) 
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Raven score 43.539 (62.690) 
45.996** 
(22.098) 
28.158 
(49.622) 
46.310** 
(22.292) 
Financial literacy score -60.494 (42.022) 
15.916 
(13.951) 
-30.767 
(43.348) 
26.364 
(23.227) 
Male Dummy 1.997 (127.84) 
78.235** 
(40.315) 
45.342 
(99.833) 
68.496* 
(42.577) 
Market characteristics     
Loan Dummy -519.461**** (74.081) 
-875.497**** 
(39.364) 
-882.271**** 
(218.870) 
-863.726**** 
(34.076) 
Hint “Not 50” Dummy –
46 184.510**** 
(45.555) 
– 176.982**** 
(45.188) 
Hint “Not 490” Dummy – 229.552**** (15.350) 
– 226.128**** 
(15.653) 
Asset value 4.112**** (0.214) 
3.766**** 
(0.148) 
4.072**** 
(0.218) 
3.731***** 
(0.162) 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
n = 227 
0.000 
n = 2,612 
0.000 
n = 326 
0.000 
n = 2,513 
0.000 
R² 0.759 0.638 0.772 0.626 
 
The coefficient associated to theory of mind (ToM Top 25% Dummy) is greater in the presence 
of winner’s curse traps than in their absence. To assess the statistical significance of this 
difference we conducted two additional regressions similar to the ones in Table C1.1 in which 
we included the whole sample and in which we added a winner’s curse dummy and an 
interaction dummy between theory of mind and the winner’s curse trap (ToM Top 25% Dummy 
× Winner’s curse Dummy).47 We found this interaction term to be statistically significant for the 
case in which we define the winner’s curse trap using the interval [200,280] (p-value = 0.011) 
and to be close to significance when using the interval [220,260] (p-value = 0.136). Statistical 
significance is most likely not achieved in the latter case because we only have 227 observations 
out of 2,839 falling into the winner’s curse trap category. 
 
Appendix C2. Imprecise (“Not 240”) vs. precise (“Not 50” or “Not 490”) hints 
                                                          
46 We do not introduce dummies for hints in the case of winner’s curse traps regressions as it would generate 
collinearity issues. 
47 These regression results are available upon request from the authors. 
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Table C2.1. Earnings and proportion of consistent orders as a function of individual characteristics and 
market variables when traders received (or did not receive) imprecise hints 
 Earnings Proportion of consistent orders 
Sample: 
Perceptive reflective and 
non-reflective traders 
Imprecise 
hints 
[1] 
Precise 
hints 
[2] 
Imprecise 
hints 
[3] 
Precise 
hints 
[4] 
Intercept 970.812**** (65.453) 
1,135.856**** 
(65.453) 
0.618**** 
(0.074) 
0.618**** 
(0.074) 
Hypothesized predictors     
CRT & ToM Top 25% Dummy48 236.289*** (91.596) 
139.194* 
(81.944) 
0.113** 
(0.045) 
0.048 
(0.042) 
 
Controls 
    
Individual characteristics     
Raven score 44.815 (47.065) 
37.043 
(32.165) 
0.030 
(0.020) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
Financial literacy score 66.350 (52.815) 
18.628 
(26.972) 
0.032 
(0.024) 
0.021 
(0.014) 
Male Dummy 64.922 (62.908) 
190.427 
(57.587) 
0.003 
(0.0666) 
-0.014 
(0.025) 
Market characteristics     
Loan Dummy -594.984**** (60.613) 
-708.206**** 
(43.205) 
-0.227** 
(0.103) 
-0.010 
(0.039) 
(0.103) 
High stakes Dummy – – 0.021 (0.044) 
-0.051*** 
(0.017) 
Hint “Not 50” Dummy – – – -0.010 (0.055) 
Asset value 3.824**** (0.295) 
3.993**** 
(0.267) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Consistent with hint – – 0.247*** (0.081) 
0.427**** 
(0.055) 
Number of transactions – – -0.005* (0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
Market number – – -0.004* -0.001 
                                                          
48 This dummy variable takes value one if a trader scores in the top 25% of all participants in terms of both CRT and 
ToM scores. 
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(0.002) (0.001) 
Observations49 
Prob > χ2 
n = 306 
0.000 
n = 816 
0.000 
n = 286 
0.000 
n = 781 
0.000 
R² 0.689 0.639 0.132 0.259 
 
 
Appendix C3. Proportion of consistent orders 
In our regression analysis of the proportion of consistent orders we follow a similar approach 
as for earnings. We add several control variables which are relevant in the case of the proportion 
of consistent orders.50 We control for the proportion of orders which are consistent with a 
trader’s own private information so that any significant effect of trader skills on the proportion of 
consistent trades cannot only be due to more consistent use of private information. We define an 
order to be consistent with one’s private information if it is a bid or a purchase (an ask or a sale) 
that is lower (higher) than or equal to the expected value of the asset given one’s own hint. 
We also control for the number of transactions as well as the market number (17 markets are 
conducted each session) in each regression. In addition, we assess whether high stakes sessions 
are characterized by a higher proportion of orders consistent with the true value of the asset using 
a High stakes Dummy variable which takes value one if a trader was involved in a high stakes 
session. However, high stakes sessions appear to lead to a lower consistency of orders.51 
Table C3.1. Proportion of consistent orders as a function of individual characteristics and market 
variables 
 
Sample: 
All 
 
[1] 
Top & Bottom 25% CRT 
[2] 
                                                          
49 The difference in observations between columns 1 and 3 (analogously 2 and 4) is due to the fact that some traders 
might not trade during a market period. Thus, these traders are excluded from the proportion of consistent orders 
regressions. 
50 Keeping exactly the same regressors as in the earnings analysis does not change the qualitative nature of the 
results. 
51 None of these additional controls were relevant for the analysis of earnings as the sum of individual earnings 
(once we divide high stakes sessions earnings by two) is the same across periods (with the same asset value), 
sessions and treatments. 
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Intercept 
0.453**** 
(0.026) 
0.420**** 
(0.034) 
Hypothesized predictors   
CRT score 0.029**** 
(0.006) 
– 
CRT Top 25% Dummy – 
0.055**** 
(0.017) 
Controls – – 
Individual characteristics   
Raven score 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
Financial literacy score 0.010 
(0.007) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
Male Dummy 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
Market characteristics   
Loan Dummy 0.001 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
High stakes Dummy 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
-0.044*** 
(0.014) 
Hint “Not 50” Dummy 0.150**** 
(0.029) 
0.169**** 
(0.031) 
Hint “Not 490” Dummy 
0.180**** 
(0.025) 
0.175**** 
(0.028) 
Asset value 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
Consistent with hint 0.197**** 
(0.018) 
0.199**** 
(0.032) 
Number of transactions 
-0.006**** 
(0.001) 
-0.006**** 
(0.001) 
Market number -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
n = 3,267 
0.000 
n = 2,086 
0.000 
R² 0.158 0.161 
 
Table C3.2. Proportion of consistent orders as a function of individual characteristics (including 
theory of mind) and market variables 
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Proportion of consistent 
orders 
 
Sample: 
All 
 
[1] 
All 
 
[2] 
Top & Bottom 
25% ToM 
[3] 
Top 25% 
CRT 
[4] 
Bottom 25% 
CRT 
[5] 
Intercept 0.450**** (0.030) 
0.447**** 
(0.030) 
0.473**** 
(0.043) 
0.387**** 
(0.064) 
0. 352**** 
(0.048) 
Hypothesized predictors      
ToM score 0.010 (0.009) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
– 
0.042*** 
(0.016) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
ToM Top 25% Dummy – – 0.047** (0.020) – – 
ToM score × CRT score – 0.018**** (0.005) – – – 
CRT score 0.032**** (0.008) 
0.032**** 
(0.007) 
0.030**** 
(0.008) 
0.083*** 
(0.024) 
-0.027 
(0.034) 
Controls      
Individual characteristics      
Raven score 0.016** (0.007) 
0.018*** 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
Financial literacy score 0.014** (0.007) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.041**** 
(0.010) 
Male Dummy -0.002 (0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.027) 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
Market characteristics      
Loan Dummy 0.014 (0.010) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.024 
(0.022) 
0.043** 
(0.019) 
0.084** 
(0.040) 
High stakes Dummy -0.015 (0.010) 
-0.018* 
(0.011) 
-0.040*** 
(0.012) 
-0.022*** 
(0.026) 
-0.025 
(0.027) 
Hint “Not 50” Dummy 0.149**** (0.028) 
0.147**** 
(0.028) 
0.183**** 
(0.040) 
0.167**** 
(0.037) 
0.147**** 
(0.037) 
Hint “Not 490” Dummy 0.180**** (0.028) 
0.180**** 
(0.028) 
0.209**** 
(0.037) 
0.175**** 
(0.036) 
0.165**** 
(0.039) 
Asset value -0.0002** (0.0001) 
-0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
Consistent with hint 0.197**** (0.022) 
0.203**** 
(0.023) 
0.155**** 
(0.025) 
0.176**** 
(0.051) 
0.249**** 
(0.052) 
Number of transactions -0.006**** (0.001) 
-0.006**** 
(0.001) 
-0.006**** 
(0.001) 
-0.006**** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Market number -0.002** -0.002** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
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(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
n = 2,698 
0.000 
n = 2,698 
0.000 
n = 1,451 
0.000 
n = 1,000 
0.000 
n = 767 
0.000 
R² 0.161 0.164 0.194 0.157 0.179 
 
 
Appendix C4. Shareholdings 
 
 
Figure C4.1. Average final shareholdings for participants in the bottom and top quartiles for 
CRT and ToM depending on the true value of the asset (50 or 490). We also represent the bottom 
quartile, median and top quartile for the whole distribution of participants’ shareholdings (see 
dashed horizontal lines). 
†P-values based on WRS comparing shareholdings of bottom and top quartiles traders in terms of CRT, ToM, and 
both CRT and ToM. *p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01 and ****p-value<0.001 
 
Table C4.1. Net holdings consistency as a function of individual characteristics (including 
theory of mind) and market variables 
Net holdings consistency   
Sample: 
All 
 
All 
 
Top 
25% CRT 
Bottom 
25% CRT 
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[1] [2] [3] [4] 
Intercept -0.537*** (0.194) 
-0.786*** 
(0.269) 
-2.470** 
(1.166) 
-0.550 
(0.440) 
Hypothesized predictors     
CRT score 0.264**** (0.070) 
0.259*** 
(0.082) 
1.105** 
(0.462) 
-0.025 
(0.387) 
CRT Top 25% Dummy – – – – 
ToM score – 0.080* (0.046) 
0.527*** 
(0.201) 
-0.148 
(0.126) 
ToM Top 25% Dummy – – – – 
ToM score × CRT score – 0.254**** (0.074) – – 
Controls     
Individual characteristics     
Raven score 0.067 (0.069) 
0.112 
(0.094) 
0.362 
(0.262) 
0.054 
(0.115) 
Financial literacy score 0.119 (0.091) 
0.115 
(0.104) 
0.051 
(0.160) 
0.285** 
(0.126) 
Male Dummy -0.148 (0.143) 
-0.124 
(0.190) 
-0.096 
(0.266) 
-0.165 
(0.369) 
Market characteristics52     
Loan Dummy 0.240** (0.107) 
0.323** 
(0.133) 
0.147 
(0.185) 
1.122** 
(0.544) 
High stakes Dummy 0.118* (0.063) 
0.208*** 
(0.071) 
0.271 
(0.366) 
0.060 
(0.181) 
Hint “Not 50” Dummy 1.867**** (0.440) 
1.909**** 
(0.467) 
1.931** 
(0.889) 
1.100** 
(0.493) 
Hint “Not 490” Dummy 1.722**** (0.404) 
1.907**** 
(0.455) 
2.049*** 
(0.696) 
1.044**** 
(0.282) 
Asset value -0.001 (0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Number of transactions -0.049** (0.025) 
-0.048* 
(0.028) 
-0.050**** 
(0.014) 
-0.012 
(0.025) 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
n = 2,040 
0.000 
n = 1,670 
0.000 
n = 600 
0.000 
n = 480 
0.000 
R² 0.056 0.061 0.065 0.058 
  
                                                          
52 We do not control for market number which turns out not to be statistically significant in any of the specifications 
used in the table. 
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Appendix D. Further inquiries into the model hypotheses 
Appendix D1. CRT and Bayesian updating 
To confirm that the positive effect of CRT on earnings is driven by the fact that high-CRT 
traders are immune to Bayesian updating mistakes, we conduct regressions in which we include 
Bayesian updating scores (following Charness and Levin, 2009, see Appendix A for the details 
of the test) as an independent variable. We collected this variable in five sessions which 
corresponds to a total of 60 traders. Because Bayesian updating scores are positively and 
significantly correlated with CRT scores (r = 0.313, p-value = 0.014) we orthogonalize the two 
variables to perform our regression analyses. In particular, we isolate the effect of Bayesian 
updating performance from CRT score performance by orthogonalizing CRT scores with respect 
to Bayesian updating scores. We find that Bayesian updating test scores explain earnings, the 
proportions of consistent orders as well as net holdings consistency whereas orthogonalized CRT 
scores do not (see Table D1.1). It follows that, in line with our theoretical hypotheses, the 
explanatory power of CRT lies in its capacity to explain individuals’ Bayesian updating 
performance. 
 
Table D1.1. Earnings as a function of extended individual characteristics and market variables  
Sample: Earnings Orders Consistency 
Net holdings 
consistency 
Intercept 991.665**** 
(33.862) 
0.467**** 
(0.042) 
-0.528 
(0.396) 
Hypothesized predictors    
Bayesian updating score 38.36** 0.019**** 0.098** 
 (18.517) (0.003) (0.047) 
CRT score 34.082 0.031 0.208 
 (45.081) (0.019) (0.173) 
Controls    
Individual characteristics    
Raven score 33.308**** 0.017 0.026 
 (8.777) (0.011) (0.140) 
Financial literacy score 16.537 0.026**** 0.264** 
 (27.332) (0.007) (0.113) 
Male 143.540*** 0.016 0.338 
 (48.421) (0.027) (0.366) 
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Market characteristics    
Hint “Not 50” 221.131**** 0.113*** 1.624** 
 (85.386) (0.042) (0.665) 
Hint “Not 490” 224.110**** 0.104** 1.298*** 
 (33.728) (0.053) (0.387) 
Asset value 4.032**** 
(0.093) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Consistent with hint – 0.191**** 
(0.035) 
– 
Number of transactions – -0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.032 
(0.024) 
Observations 1,020 988 600 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.658 0.116 0.077 
 
Appendix D2. Theory of mind and CRT rank beliefs 
To further establish the soundness of our model, we aim to connect the positive effect of theory 
of mind skills to one’s capacity to assess other traders’ levels of cognitive reflection. To that end, 
we first compute a variable capturing the accuracy of traders’ beliefs regarding their own ranking 
in terms of CRT scores. Due to the follow-up survey, we have individual information regarding a 
subject’s perception of their CRT rank in the population of 1,642 students in the lab subject pool. 
Because we know all CRT scores of the pool of subjects in our database, we can also compute 
the absolute difference between one’s perceived CRT rank and one’s actual rank. We refer to 
this measure as the CRT beliefs mismatch. In line with our model, this measure is significantly 
and negatively correlated with ToM scores (r = -0.28, p-value < 0.001). It is worth noting that 
this measure also correlates positively and significantly with CRT-based overconfidence (r = 
0.23, p-value = 0.003) as most subjects (63.2%) who have positive CRT beliefs mismatch are 
also overconfident, perceiving their rank to be better than it actually is.53  
  For each session, we can also calculate the absolute difference between one’s perceived CRT 
rank in the lab subject pool and their actual CRT rank in a given session. This captures the 
                                                          
53 The CRT-based overconfidence measure is calculated, in the spirit of Svenson (1981), by taking the difference 
between one’s actual CRT rank and one’s perceived CRT rank using as reference the pool of subjects eligible to 
participate in experiments at the lab where the study was conducted (n = 1,642 at the time of the study). 
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mismatch between a trader’s belief regarding their perceived CRT rank and their actual rank in 
the market. We refer to this variable as CRT beliefs market mismatch. In line with our model, 
CRT beliefs market mismatch affects earnings negatively (see Table D2.1, column [1]). We also 
show that our CRT-based overconfidence measure does not affect earnings once it is 
orthogonalized with respect to CRT beliefs market mismatch (see Table D2.1, column [4]). 
Interestingly, the negative effect of the variable CRT beliefs market mismatch is limited to the 
case of non-perceptive traders (see Table D2.1). This finding is consistent with the fact that 
perceptive traders may be more able to adjust their beliefs to current market conditions than non-
perceptive traders. Thus, perceptive traders may not suffer from initially misleading CRT 
ranking beliefs. 
In the case in which the variable CRT beliefs market mismatch is equal to zero, traders’ beliefs 
regarding their CRT rank correspond to their actual CRT rank in the market. This resembles the 
situation in our model in which 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝛼𝛼.54 In the case in which traders hold accurate beliefs 
about their actual CRT rank in the market we expect theory of mind to be less relevant. In line 
with this conjecture, we find that the positive effect of ToM scores only arises when traders have 
inaccurate beliefs about their actual CRT rank (see columns [2] and [3] Table D2.2). 
In our model, high theory-of-mind skills traders, which we refer to as perceptive, have a more 
precise assessment of the proportion of reflective traders in the market than low theory-of-mind 
skills traders. To obtain a direct measure of the ability of traders to assess the composition of 
behavioral types in the market, we ask them, at the end of the experiment, how they would rank 
themselves on the CRT compared to the other traders in the market (see Appendix A). We then 
compute the distance between their perceived rank and their actual rank as a way to assess the 
accuracy of their beliefs regarding other traders’ CRT scores. We consider that, the larger the 
distance the less accurate a trader’s belief is regarding the distribution of CRT scores in the 
market.55 In line with the previous argument, this measure correlates positively with theory of 
mind skills (r = 0.174).  This positive correlation does not reach statistical significance (p-value 
                                                          
54 We do not elicit traders’ beliefs about the distribution of behavioral types so we cannot ensure that 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝛼𝛼. 
55 We do not elicit the whole distribution of beliefs regarding CRT scores, however.  
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= 0.236), however, as we collected the end-of-experiment CRT rank elicitation measure for only 
a subset of 48 subjects which limits the power of our statistical analysis.  
 
Table D2.1. Earnings as a function of individual characteristics and CRT beliefs market mismatch 
Sample: 
All 
 
[1] 
Bottom 25% 
ToM 
[2] 
Top 25% 
ToM 
[3] 
All 
 
[4] 
Intercept 1,054.390**** 1,070.224**** 1,138.749**** 1,050.912**** 
 (45.469) (138.890) (144.999) (46.237) 
Hypothesized predictors     
CRT beliefs market mismatch -27.341** -42.821** -10.450 -27.421*** 
 (11.071) (17.303) (36.343) (10.031) 
CRT-based overconfidence – – – -25.845 
    (16.853) 
ToM score 33.353*** 33.007 67.049 34.209** 
 (12.471) (21.542) (107.140) (13.487) 
CRT score 41.045** -19.417 55.762 39.955** 
 (18.959) (31.814) (35.008) (16.620) 
Controls     
Individual characteristics     
Raven score 44.655** 64.127*** -16.708 44.661** 
 (18.092) (23.102) (34.415) (18.267) 
Financial literacy score 8.506 -26.824 15.633 8.053 
 (14.687) (26.084) (21.966) (14.948) 
Male 75.089** 207.752**** 59.715 82.979** 
 (36.330) (59.325) (57.314) (36.387) 
Market characteristics     
Loan Dummy -865.336**** -715.721**** -870.213**** -862.288**** 
 (32.789) (32.823) (60.044) (29.142) 
Hint “Not 50” 198.278**** 233.428** 181.879** 197.379**** 
 (45.551) (91.735) (77.035) (45.000) 
Hint “Not 490” 234.096**** 261.529**** 174.684*** 234.554**** 
 (16.264) (54.072) (65.085) (16.130) 
Asset value 3.808**** 3.293**** 3.653**** 3.810**** 
 (0.135) (0.419) (0.242) (0.135) 
Observations 2,839 697 816 2,839 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.650 0.598 0.695 0.651 
 
Table D2.2. Earnings as a function of individual characteristics and market variables for traders 
who hold accurate beliefs about their CRT rank and those who do not. 
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Sample: 
CRT beliefs market 
mismatch  
Equal to zero 
CRT beliefs market 
mismatch 
Different from zero 
Intercept 978.050**** 1,071.464**** 
 (92.058) (52.046) 
Hypothesized predictors   
CRT score 5.926 48.772** 
 (35.507) (19.755) 
ToM score 66.926 34.862** 
 (46.094) (16.302) 
Controls   
Individual characteristics   
Raven score 35.602 46.533** 
 (29.780) (21.959) 
Financial literacy score 79.661 2.013 
 (63.647) (12.880) 
Male 99.447 69.137* 
 (68.555) (41.388) 
Market characteristics   
Loan Dummy -716.166**** -879.815**** 
 (95.797) (51.675) 
Hint “Not 50” 162.573 200.650**** 
 (112.131) (51.107) 
Hint “Not 490” 177.156** 239.868**** 
 (79.831) (18.681) 
Asset value 4.328**** 3.735**** 
 (0.373) (0.147) 
Observations 357 2,482 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.719 0.642 
 
Appendix E. Gender effects 
Gender and earnings 
In line with previous research, we find that men have higher CRT scores than women (3.42 vs. 
2.53, p-value=0.001, WRS) (Frederick, 2005, Brañas-Garza, Kujal and Lenkei, 2016) whereas 
the opposite is true for ToM scores (24.41 vs. 26.61, p-value = 0.023, WRS) (Baron Cohen et al. 
1997). Thus, our findings put forward that both ‘men’ and ‘women’ skills are needed to perform 
well in markets. However, in our setting, men tend to earn more ($38.98) than women ($37.21) 
(p-value = 0.013, WRS). 
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Interestingly, this male effect disappears when considering other measures of trader 
performance such as the proportion of consistent orders (see Tables C3.1 and C3.2) or net 
holdings consistency (Table C4.1). The proportion of consistent orders for men is equal to 
60.72% compared to 59.67% for women (p-value = 0.690, WRS). Net holdings consistency for 
women (0.036) is actually slightly higher than for men (-0.054) (p-value = 0.625, WRS). In 
addition, in situations in which theory of mind is supposedly the most important, such as the 
Winner’s curse traps situations à la Biais et al. (2005) (Table C1.1) or imprecise hints (Table 
C2.1), the Male Dummy does not explain trader earnings significantly. 
Trading activity and earnings 
In line with Barber and Odean (2001) and Biais et al. (2005), we find that trading activity as 
measured by the number of completed transactions in a given period negatively affects earnings 
(see Table E1).56 Also in line with Barber and Odean (2001) and Biais et al. (2005), we find that 
men (6.88) trade more than women (5.87) (p-value = 0.082, WRS). Interestingly, not all men 
trade more than women. Instead, high trading skills (Top 25% in CRT and ToM scores) men 
engage in more trades than high trading skills women (7.20 vs. 4.67, p-value = 0.074, WRS) 
whereas the opposite is true for low trading skills (4.44 vs. 6.43, which is not significant 
however, p-value = 0.262, WRS). It follows that men who are in the top 25% in terms of CRT 
and ToM scores trade more than those who are in the bottom 25% (p-value = 0.045, WRS) 
whereas it is not the case for women (p-value = 0.401, WRS). 
Relatedly, men are not more overconfident in their trading skills than women. According to our 
CRT-based overconfidence measure, men and women do not differ in terms of overconfidence 
(1.328 vs 1.528, p-value = 0.693, WRS). In line with Biais et al. (2005) results, we find that our 
measure of overconfidence does not correlate with trading activity (p-value = 0.811). 
To account for the difference in trading activity between men and women, we calculate the net 
gains per trade for each trader in each market. This is calculated as the earnings of the trader in a 
given market minus the value of the portfolio each trader is endowed with (this is calculated as 
                                                          
56 Similar results are obtained if we use the total number of orders as a measure of trading activity. 
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the cash endowment plus the number of shares each trader is given multiplied by the value of the 
asset in a given market) divided by the number of transactions completed by that trader. The 
Male Dummy coefficient becomes statistically insignificant when using net gains per trade as the 
dependent variable instead of earnings (see Table E1). 
Table E1. Trader earnings and net gains per trade as a function of individual characteristics and 
market variables 
 
Trader  
earnings 
Net gains per 
trade 
Intercept 1,124.844**** 
(42.377) 
-236.458**** 
(22.307) 
Hypothesized predictors   
CRT score 46.149*** 
(17.262) 
9.776** 
(4.022) 
ToM score 
38.801**** 
(11.944) 
9.628** 
(4.071) 
Number of trades 
-11.467*** 
(3.670) 
-0.642 
(2.142) 
Controls   
Individual characteristics   
Raven score 
47.559*** 
(16.546) 
0.862 
(4.572) 
Financial literacy score 12.302 
(13.361) 
2.681 
(3.642) 
Male dummy 
82.398*** 
(30.824) 
-5.161 
(10.651) 
Market characteristics   
Loan Dummy -806.333**** 
(37.344) 
-165.816**** 
(14.159) 
Hint “Not 50” Dummy 
204.446**** 
(45.884) 
34.282* 
(19.776) 
Hint “Not 490” Dummy 231.689**** 
(17.515) 
37.125** 
(15.335) 
Asset value 
3.777**** 
(0.135) 
1.032**** 
(0.091) 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
n = 2,839 
0.000 
n = 2,653 
0.000 
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R² 0.658 0.442 
 
 
Appendix F. Robustness checks 
Appendix F1. Additional individual controls 
We add the following individual controls to our regressions: risk attitudes, GPA, school 
dummies, personality traits (big five and self-monitoring scale). All of these measures were 
collected during the one-hour follow-up survey (see Appendix A). 
Risk attitudes  
Controlling for risk attitudes allows us to eliminate a possible confound in our analysis of 
trader earnings. For example, more risk tolerant traders may be more likely to trade (Fellner and 
Maciejovsky, 2007) and engage in risky, speculative trading strategies that may lead to higher 
returns. In addition, risk aversion has been found to correlate negatively with cognitive ability 
(Dohmen et al. 2010; Beauchamp, Cesarini and Johannesson, 2014) so that controlling for risk 
attitudes appears to be essential in isolating the effect of cognitive ability on trader performance. 
Our measure of an individual’s risk attitudes is the number of safe choices in the Holt and 
Laury risk elicitation task (2002).57 
Personality traits  
We administered the 44-item version of the Big Five personality test which was developed by 
John, Donahue and Kentle (1991) and John, Naumann and Soto (2008). We use personality traits 
as control variables because they have been shown to relate to financial decision making. For 
example, Brown and Taylor (2014) show that personality traits may affect household finance 
decisions identifying, for example, a positive relationship between openness and the probability 
of holding stocks. Also, Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer (2014) show that controlling for 
                                                          
57 The proportion of subjects inconsistently switching between the safer and the riskier option (13.2%) was similar 
to the proportion reported in Holt and Laury (2002) (about 10% of the cases). Our analysis is not qualitatively 
affected by removing these inconsistent subjects from the analysis. In the results section we present the results for all 
subjects, regardless of their consistency in the Holt and Laury risk attitudes elicitation task. 
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personality traits affects the magnitude and significance of the effect of financial literacy on 
financial decisions. Finally, personality traits have been found to correlate with several of the 
measures collected in our study. For example, openness has been found to correlate positively 
with Raven test scores (see DeYoung, 2011; Beauchamp, Cesarini and Johannesson, 2012), 
while both agreeableness and openness have been found to correlate positively with theory of 
mind skills (see Mayer et al. 2011). 
School dummies take value 1 for each of the following schools: business and economics (27% 
of the subjects), educational studies (5%), film and media arts (19%), humanities and social 
sciences (14%), law school (8%), performing arts (8%), science and technology (15%), 
pharmacy and health and behavioral sciences (4%). 
The self-monitoring scale is based on Snyder and Gangestad (1986) which is the scale used by 
Biais et al. (2005).  
Table F1.1. Earnings as a function of extended individual characteristics and market variables  
Sample: All Top 25% 
CRT 
Bottom 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 1,068.356**** 1.782 1,485.138**** 
 (182.569) (244.548) (316.070) 
Hypothesized predictors    
CRT score 47.878*** 81.938 39.937 
 (17.381) (53.185) (91.657) 
ToM score 33.568**** 107.153**** 28.356 
 (9.966) (21.323) (22.769) 
Controls    
Individual characteristics    
Raven score 41.615** 40.110** 43.273** 
 (17.491) (18.035) (21.918) 
Financial literacy score -7.653 -35.758** 28.829 
 (15.394) (17.816) (26.594) 
Male 61.233* 99.832** 126.561 
 (34.740) (45.934) (87.653) 
Risk attitudes -1.009 2.204 -0.049 
 (7.554) (10.414) (9.277) 
GPA 30.481 338.003**** 59.581 
 (30.713) (75.714) (55.376) 
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School Dummies ns ns58 ns59 
Big five personality traits 
& Self-monitoring scale ns ns ns 
 
Market characteristics    
Loan Dummy -846.254**** -922.309**** -710.814**** 
 (40.970) (71.175) (78.852) 
Hint “Not 50” 197.531**** 131.290 222.934**** 
 (45.185) (79.843) (63.918) 
Hint “Not 490” 233.167**** 175.287**** 215.877**** 
 (16.454) (33.607) (46.986) 
Asset value 3.808**** 
(0.138) 
4.014**** 
(0.180) 
3.761**** 
(0.252) 
Observations 2,839 1,020 816 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.655 0.687 0.679 
 
 
Table F1.2. Proportion of consistent orders and net holdings consistency as a function of 
extended individual characteristics and market variables 
 Proportion of consistent orders Net holdings consistency 
Sample: All Top 25% 
CRT All 
Top 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 0.351*** 0.003 0.000 -8.244**** 
 (0.111) (0.183) (0.992) (1.195) 
Hypothesized predictors     
CRT score 0.038**** 0.070*** 0.350*** 0.764*** 
 (0.008) (0.023) (0.123) (0.287) 
ToM score 0.011 0.053**** 0.079 0.711**** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.080) (0.136) 
Controls     
Individual characteristics     
Raven score 0.016** 0.023* 0.081 0.379**** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.086) (0.115) 
Financial literacy score 0.013 0.001 0.117 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.100) (0.117) 
Male 0.002 0.037 0.024 0.795*** 
                                                          
58 We observe a significant (p-value = 0.043) positive effect for the dummy variable associated to the school of 
Business and Economics. 
59 We observe a significant (p-value = 0.002) positive effect for the dummy variable associated to the school of 
Business and Economics. 
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 (0.014) (0.038) (0.231) (0.262) 
     
Risk attitudes -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.093 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.034) (0.076) 
GPA 0.007 0.104*** -0.134 2.292**** 
 (0.011) (0.038) (0.172) (0.372) 
School Dummies ns ns ns ns60 
Big five personality traits 
& Self-monitoring scale ns ns ns ns 
Market characteristics     
Loan Dummy 0.021 0.001 0.447*** 0.816*** 
 (0.018) (0.050) (0.167) (0.290) 
High stakes Dummy -0.017 0.007 0.314 0.300 
 (0.024) (0.036) (0.198) (0.477) 
Hint “Not 50” 0.148**** 0.165**** 1.904**** 1.893** 
 (0.029) (0.040) (0.448) (0.900) 
Hint “Not 490” 0.180**** 0.182**** 1.928**** 2.178*** 
 (0.028) (0.037) (0.477) (0.812) 
Asset value -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Consistent with hint 0.197**** 0.171**** – – 
 (0.021) (0.047)   
Number of transactions -0.006**** -0.006**** -0.050* -0.039*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.026) (0.014) 
Market number -0.002** -0.001 – – 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
R² 
2,698 1,000 1,670 600 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.167 0.182 0.0685 0.100 
 
Appendix F2.  Session fixed effects 
Tables F2.1 and F2.2 report results for regressions that include session fixed effects. 
Table F2.1. Earnings as a function of individual characteristics and market variables 
Sample: All 
Top 25% 
CRT 
Bottom 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 1,103.892**** 898.194**** 1,105.777**** 
                                                          
60 We observe a significant (p-values < 0.05) positive effect for the dummy variables associated to the school of 
Humanities and for the school of Health and Behavioral Sciences. 
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 (42.702) (98.288) (185.452) 
Hypothesized predictors    
CRT score 50.956*** 181.484** 9.525 
 (18.319) (73.069) (148.442) 
ToM score 36.203*** 61.650** 57.909** 
 (12.801) (26.862) (24.388) 
Controls    
Individual characteristics    
Raven score 45.523** 36.422 43.153* 
 (18.233) (32.185) (25.249) 
Financial literacy score 3.153 11.510 18.924 
 (18.705) (28.353) (31.031) 
Male 84.366** 27.195 155.758** 
 (38.471) (78.884) (74.216) 
Market characteristics    
Loan Dummy -881.650**** -928.579**** -691.640**** 
 (25.505) (40.818) (36.115) 
Hint “Not 50” 198.821**** 139.237* 223.509**** 
 (45.905) (76.284) (60.944) 
Hint “Not 490” 234.017**** 167.845**** 217.207**** 
 (16.375) (35.215) (47.025) 
Asset value 3.807**** 3.997**** 3.762**** 
 (0.136) (0.181) (0.248) 
Observations 
R² 
2,839 1,020 816 
0.652 0.679 0.675 
 
Table F2.2. Proportion of consistent orders and net holdings consistency as a function of 
individual characteristics and market variables 
 Proportion of consistent orders Net holdings consistency 
Sample: All 
Top 25% 
CRT All 
Top 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 0.465**** 0.399**** -0.547** -1.921* 
 (0.031) (0.054) (0.259) (1.152) 
Hypothesized predictors     
CRT score 0.032**** 0.094**** 0.301*** 1.274** 
 (0.008) (0.026) (0.096) (0.563) 
ToM score 0.006 0.044*** 0.007 0.396* 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.060) (0.239) 
Controls     
Individual characteristics     
Raven score 0.015** 0.012 0.095 0.351 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.090) (0.300) 
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Financial literacy score 0.015** 0.004 0.115 0.061 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.125) (0.219) 
Male -0.003 -0.001 -0.222 -0.257 
 (0.010) (0.038) (0.239) (0.417) 
Market characteristics     
Loan Dummy -0.008 -0.083**** -0.072 -0.931** 
 (0.009) (0.023) (0.138) (0.384) 
High stakes Dummy -0.059**** -0.110**** 0.221 -0.618 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.151) (0.389) 
Hint “Not 50” 0.148**** 0.167**** 1.943**** 1.903* 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.493) (1.041) 
Hint “Not 490” 0.180**** 0.175**** 1.888**** 2.044*** 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.445) (0.678) 
Asset value -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Consistent with hint 0.197**** 0.174**** – – 
 (0.022) (0.050) 
Number of transactions -0.006**** -0.006**** -0.051 -0.060**** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.031) (0.018) 
Market number -0.002* -0.001 – – 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations 
R² 
2,698 1,000 1,670 600 
0.164 0.170 0.0600 0.0696 
 
Appendix F3. Analysis of total earnings and total proportion of consistent orders 
We define a subject’s total earnings as the sum of her earnings from all seventeen markets. Total 
consistency of orders is defined as the average proportion of consistent orders of a given trader 
over the course of the seventeen markets. 
Table F3.1. Earnings and proportion of consistent orders as a function of individual 
characteristics and market variables  
 Earnings Proportion of consistent 
orders 
Sample: All Top 25% 
CRT 
Bottom 25% 
CRT 
All 
Top 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 37,216.955**** 35,541.383**** 35,657.499**** 0.475**** 0.567* 
 (269.417) (1,134.972) (2,322.039) (0.106) (0.269) 
Hypothesized predictors      
CRT score 707.776** 2,546.296** -106.951 0.019 -0.031 
 (306.160) (1,122.593) (1,974.757) (0.028) (0.066) 
ToM score 658.585** 1,339.453*** 821.068** 0.026 0.076** 
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 (261.239) (425.966) (351.592) (0.023) (0.032) 
Controls      
Individual characteristics      
Raven score 773.014** 704.426 875.471* 0.030* 0.026 
 (336.221) (518.552) (437.662) (0.016) (0.039) 
Financial literacy score 150.507 -113.119 666.528 0.045* 0.051 
 (255.266) (409.257) (434.013) (0.022) (0.037) 
Male 1,227.010* 296.111 2,571.782** 0.066 0.163* 
 (643.393) (1,027.378) (1,015.524) (0.048) (0.086) 
Market characteristics      
Loan Dummy -14,702.507**** -16,603.597**** -11,441.226**** 0.062** -0.112* 
 (545.940) (738.950) (1,228.827) (0.028) (0.056) 
High stakes Dummy – – – -0.012 -0.114 
    (0.036) (0.106) 
Consistent with hint – – – 0.408*** 0.375  (0.130) (0.291) 
Number of transactions – – – -0.014**** -0.014*  (0.003) (0.007) 
Observations 167 60 48 155 57 
R² 0.689 0.743 0.621 0.287 0.345 
 
Even though panel data databases with less than 20 time observations (17 in our case) are less 
subject to serial correlation issues (Baltagi, 2013), we assessed the robustness of our findings to 
allowing for an autoregressive structure of order 1 in the error term (see Tables F3.2 and F3.3). 
Similar results are obtained if we allow for a moving average of order 1 instead. 
 
Table F3.2. Earnings as a function of individual characteristics and market variables  
 
All 
Top 25% 
CRT 
Bottom 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 1,063.802**** 964.354**** 988.254**** 
 (29.817) (66.292) (137.739) 
Hypothesized predictors    
CRT score 45.047*** 143.872*** 7.159 
 (15.473) (48.135) (105.925) 
ToM score 39.072** 77.781** 46.035** 
 (15.278) (32.596) (23.005) 
Controls    
Individual characteristics    
Raven score 45.241*** 42.240 48.525** 
 (15.028) (29.110) (22.278) 
Financial literacy score 8.588 -4.902 35.167 
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 (15.036) (25.635) (27.229) 
Male 75.574** 24.864 150.441** 
 (32.864) (54.477) (61.599) 
Individual characteristics    
Loan Dummy -869.292**** -974.800**** -673.388**** 
 (46.949) (77.043) (94.883) 
Hint “Not 50” 197.337**** 134.671*** 220.924**** 
 (24.573) (41.394) (44.990) 
Hint “Not 490” 224.863**** 161.873**** 211.717**** 
 (24.398) (41.483) (44.028) 
Asset value 3.786**** 3.984**** 3.742**** 
 (0.062) (0.105) (0.115) 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
R² 
2,839 1,020 816 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.650 0.670 0.661 
 
Table F3.3. Proportion of consistent orders and net holdings consistency as a function of 
individual characteristics and market variables 
 Proportion of consistent 
orders Net holdings consistency 
 
Sample: All 
Top 25% 
CRT 
All Top 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 0.439**** 0.379**** -0.875** -2.551*** 
 (0.023) (0.043) (0.340) (0.794) 
Hypothesized predictors     
CRT score 0.033**** 0.082**** 0.284* 1.173** 
 (0.007) (0.023) (0.150) (0.537) 
ToM score 0.010 0.043*** 0.016 0.526 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.146) (0.363) 
Controls     
Individual characteristics     
Raven score 0.016** 0.012 0.093 0.391 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.143) (0.324) 
Financial literacy 0.014** 0.009 0.072 0.022 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.144) (0.285) 
Male -0.003 -0.003 -0.272 -0.195 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.315) (0.615) 
Market characteristics     
Loan Dummy 0.012 -0.044 0.122 0.168 
 (0.022) (0.040) (0.474) (0.922) 
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High stakes Dummy -0.016 -0.022 0.221 0.180 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.315) (0.625) 
Hint “Not 50” 0.151**** 0.166**** 2.046**** 2.012*** 
 (0.015) (0.025) (0.350) (0.701) 
Hint “Not 490” 0.181**** 0.177**** 1.898**** 2.067*** 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.318) (0.646) 
Asset value -0.001**** -0.001* -0.001 0.002 
 (0.0001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Consistent with hint 0.193**** 0.179**** 
– –  (0.020) (0.035) 
Number of transactions -0.006**** -0.006**** -0.024 -0.042 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.020) (0.036) 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
R² 
2,698 1,000 1,670 600 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
0.161 0.157 0.0565 0.0651 
 
Appendix F4. Non-orthogonal variables 
Table F4.1. Earnings as a function of individual characteristics and market variables 
Sample: 
All 
 
All 
 
Top 25% 
CRT 
Bottom 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 809.640**** 605.696**** 221.846 519.199*** 
 (158.532) (138.689) (304.929) (190.366) 
Hypothesized predictors     
CRT score 17.081** 15.030 71.821** -14.526 
 (11.596) (11.596) (33.340) (60.721) 
ToM score – 4.672** 11.531*** 5.136* 
 (2.103) (3.531) (2.864) 
Controls     
Individual characteristics     
Raven score 15.065 19.399** 18.228 19.936* 
 (9.657) (8.087) (13.084) (10.261) 
Financial literacy score 1.797 3.480 -2.121 14.751 
 (5.095) (6.014) (9.571) (10.806) 
Male 64.802* 74.916** 24.505 147.881*** 
 (37.665) (35.923) (56.777) (52.012) 
Market characteristics     
Loan Dummy -879.488**** -865.255**** -971.785**** -663.644**** 
 (23.809) (32.963) (42.289) (73.364) 
Hint “Not 50” 191.144**** 198.245**** 137.586* 222.133**** 
 (48.822) (45.523) (75.778) (59.192) 
Hint “Not 490” 211.048**** 234.134**** 169.026**** 218.423**** 
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 (20.222) (16.264) (34.530) (46.904) 
Asset value 3.835**** 3.808**** 4.000**** 3.765**** 
 (0.132) (0.135) (0.180) (0.243) 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
R² 
3,468 2,839 1,020 816 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.645 0.650 0.670 0.661 
 
Table F4.2. Proportion of consistent orders and net holdings consistency as a function of 
individual characteristics and market variables 
 Proportion of consistent orders Net holdings consistency 
Sample: All 
Top 25% 
CRT All 
Top 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 0.264**** 0.008 -1.873*** -8.175** 
 (0.047) (0.133) (0.659) (3.399) 
Hypothesized predictors     
CRT score 0.012** 0.041*** 0.104* 0.529** 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.060) (0.227) 
ToM score 0.001 0.007** 0.002 0.075*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.026) 
Controls     
Individual characteristics     
Raven score 0.007** 0.005 0.032 0.156 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.037) (0.113) 
Financial literacy score 0.006** 0.004 0.045 0.021 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.043) (0.066) 
Male -0.002 -0.003 -0.149 -0.096 
 (0.010) (0.027) (0.187) (0.266) 
Market characteristics     
Loan Dummy 0.014 -0.043** 0.317** 0.271 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.159) (0.366) 
High stakes Dummy -0.016 -0.022 0.241*** 0.147 
 (0.010) (0.026) (0.085) (0.185) 
Hint “Not 50” 0.148**** 0.167**** 1.920**** 1.931** 
 (0.028) (0.037) (0.473) (0.889) 
Hint “Not 490” 0.180**** 0.175**** 1.901**** 2.049*** 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.450) (0.696) 
Asset value -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Consistent with hint 0.197**** 0.176**** 
– –  (0.022) (0.051)  
Number of transactions -0.006**** -0.006**** -0.047* -0.050**** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.028) (0.014) 
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Market number -0.002** -0.001 – –  (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
R² 
2,698 1,000 1,670 600 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.161 0.157 0.0580 0.0654 
  
Appendix F5. High stakes sessions 
 
 
Figure F5.1. Average prices per minute per market for the ten baseline and five high stakes 
sessions (dashed curves). Prices for the high stakes sessions are divided by two to facilitate 
comparison between the two treatments. 
 
Table F5.1. Earnings as a function of individual characteristics and market variables 
Sample: All Top 25% Bottom 25% 
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CRT CRT 
 Intercept 1,030.443**** (48.222) 
963.502**** 
(102.196) 
797.605*** 
(269.070) 
Hypothesized predictors    
CRT score 47.323*** (18.143) 
130.732 
(86.296) 
-75.113 
(18.143) 
ToM score 40.604** (15.867) 
71.252*** 
(23.842) 
59.895 
(39.656) 
CRT score × High stakes Dummy 6.605 (40.138) 
51.101 
(104.431) 
131.627 
(239.143) 
ToM score × High stakes Dummy -11.348 (22.661) 
14.833 
(90.536) 
-42.465 
(46.962) 
Controls    
Individual characteristics    
Raven score 45.051** (17.722) 
43.212 
(29.865) 
42.174* 
(22.222) 
Financial literacy score 6.609 (15.582) 
-2.213 
(23.152) 
34.125 
(20.527) 
Male Dummy 78.508** (36.632) 
24.063 
(59.144) 
-572.762**** 
(73.948) 
Market characteristics    
Loan Dummy -843.291**** (32.719) 
-959.753**** 
(43.284) 
-575.762**** 
(73.948) 
High stakes Dummy 58.096**** (13.999) 
-26.298 
(102.044) 
289.274 
(281.067) 
Hint “Not 50” Dummy 198.673**** (45.554) 
138.112**** 
(75.715) 
224.101**** 
(58.775) 
Hint “Not 490” Dummy 234.333**** (13.313) 
169.075**** 
(34.601) 
2184.926**** 
(47.440) 
Asset value 3.808**** (0.136) 
4.000**** 
(0.180) 
3.763**** 
(0.243) 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
2,839 
0.000 
1,020 
0.000 
816 
0.000 
R² 0.651 0.670 0.668 
 
Table F5.2. Proportion of consistent orders and net holdings consistency as a function of 
individual characteristics and market variables 
 Proportion of consistent orders Net holdings consistency 
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Sample: All 
Top 25% 
CRT All 
Top 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 0.450**** (0.031) 
0.392**** 
(0.068) 
-0.785*** 
(0.277) 
-2.331* 
(1.336) 
Hypothesized predictors     
CRT score 0.028*** (0.008) 
0.078** 
(0.033) 
0.225* 
(0.127) 
0.969 
(0.606) 
ToM score 0.015 (0.011) 
0.047**** 
(0.014) 
0.038 
(0.081) 
0.499** 
(0.234) 
CRT score × High stakes Dummy 0.0156 (0.017) 
0.040 
(0.038) 
0.113 
(0.162) 
0.519 
(0.710) 
ToM score × High stakes Dummy -0.022 (0.015) 
0.081* 
(0.043) 
-0.037 
(0.142) 
-0.057 
(0.578) 
Controls     
Individual characteristics     
Raven score 0.014** (0.007) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.076 
(0.086) 
0.365 
(0.246) 
Financial literacy score 0.014** (0.007) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.112 
(0.106) 
0.071 
(0.171) 
Male Dummy -0.001 (0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.028) 
-0.152 
(0.194) 
-0.063 
(0.284) 
Market characteristics     
Loan Dummy 0.017* (0.010) 
0.041** 
(0.018) 
0.324** 
(0.163) 
0.320 
(0.350) 
High stakes Dummy -0.011 (0.010) 
-0.044 
(0.043) 
0.260*** 
(0.088) 
-0.358 
(0.761) 
Hint “Not 50” Dummy 0.148**** (0.028) 
0.168**** 
(0.037) 
1.927**** 
(0.471) 
1.941** 
(0.869) 
Hint “Not 490” Dummy 0.180**** (0.028) 
0.176**** 
(0.036) 
1.899**** 
(0.452) 
2.053*** 
(0.695) 
Asset value -0.001** (0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Consistent with hint 0.197**** (0.022) 
0.175*** 
(0.051) – – 
Number of transactions -0.006**** (0.001) 
-0.006**** 
(0.001) – – 
Market number -0.002** (0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) – – 
Observations 
Prob > χ2 
2,698 
0.000 
1,000 
0.000 
1,670 
0.000 
600 
0.000 
R² 0.162 0.160 0.058 0.066 
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Appendix F6. Independent variables measured as deviations from session average61 
Table F6.1. Earnings as a function of individual characteristics and market variables 
Sample: All 
Top 25% 
CRT 
Bottom 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 1,055.636**** 1,011.268**** 1,119.415**** 
 (45.909) (77.775) (81.394) 
Hypothesized predictors    
CRT score 50.784*** 38.645 62.433*** 
 (18.456) (25.801) (22.289) 
ToM score 49.484*** 106.303** 135.296** 
 (16.871) (53.006) (57.107) 
Controls    
Individual characteristics    
Raven score 8.312 18.863 29.777 
 (17.465) (24.718) (26.087) 
Financial literacy score 23.323** 29.333 34.823* 
 (11.657) (25.191) (18.597) 
Male 69.553** 17.490 143.237*** 
 (34.579) (54.342) (49.951) 
Market characteristics    
Loan Dummy -859.578**** -964.161**** -636.480**** 
 (28.433) (41.366) (86.397) 
Hint “Not 50” 198.967**** 140.310* 220.197**** 
 (45.674) (76.254) (57.752) 
Hint “Not 490” 234.146**** 168.796**** 219.408**** 
 (16.321) (34.662) (47.193) 
Asset value 3.807**** 3.997**** 3.769**** 
 (0.136) (0.180) (0.241) 
Observations 2,839 1,020 816 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.650 0.667 0.665 
 
Table F6.2. Proportion of consistent orders and net holdings consistency as a function of 
individual characteristics and market variables 
 Proportion of consistent orders Net holdings consistency 
Sample: All Top 25% CRT All 
Top 25% 
CRT 
Intercept 0.457**** 0.424**** -0.735*** -2.075** 
 (0.030) (0.068) (0.256) (1.027) 
Hypothesized predictors     
                                                          
61 Similar results are obtained when using session median instead. 
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CRT score 0.015*** 0.009 0.091 0.360 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.088) (0.244) 
ToM score 0.032**** 0.065*** 0.273*** 0.969*** 
 (0.008) (0.022) (0.086) (0.354) 
Controls     
Individual characteristics     
Raven score 0.016** 0.019 0.099 0.164 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.108) (0.190) 
Financial literacy score 0.002 0.021 -0.008 0.257* 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.057) (0.154) 
Male -0.005 -0.004 -0.169 -0.125 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.189) (0.236) 
Market characteristics     
Loan Dummy 0.013 -0.053**** 0.319** 0.202 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.152) (0.321) 
High stakes Dummy -0.031** -0.048 0.126 -0.268 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.081) (0.259) 
Hint “Not 50” 0.148**** 0.170**** 1.930**** 1.966** 
 (0.028) (0.037) (0.473) (0.914) 
Hint “Not 490” 0.179**** 0.175**** 1.897**** 2.033*** 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.451) (0.689) 
Asset value -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Consistent with hint 0.198**** 0.174**** – –  (0.021) (0.049) 
Number of transactions -0.006**** -0.006**** -0.048* -0.054**** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.028) (0.015) 
Market number -0.002** -0.001 – –  (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations 2,698 1,000 1,670 600 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.160 0.151 0.0583 0.0638 
 
Online Appendix 
Appendix O1 (instructions) and O2 (asset prices charts). (click here) 
Link: goo.gl/PBLxWs 
 
 
